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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

AUSTIN RICE,
Plain~iff

and Appellant,

Case No.
72'68

vs..
ERMA RICE, Executrix and Trustee, In
the matter of the Estate of David L.
Rice, Deceased,
·Defendant and Resp!ondent.

'

:.l

INTRODUCTORY
This case has been before the court on a p·rior occasion, In-re : Rice ''S Estate, Rice vs. Rice,· No. 7029 in
this court, 182 Pac. ( 2) 111. The ease is here now on the
appeal of the plaintiff and the cross appeal of the defendant from the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment
of the District Court of Davis County. (The testimony
in this ease is s.ep1arately nlllnbe~red from the record, 'and
hereinafter the record will be referred to by the letter
' 'R' ' and the testimony by the letter '' T '').
At the outset it may be helpful to make a brief statement ·of the issues involved which will he supported later
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with references to the record. Austin Rice, the plaintiff
and appellant, is the son of David L. Rice. David L. Rice
willed to Austin ''the land now occupied by him'' at
Farmington, U't.ah. The executrix and trustee under the
will is the defendant, Erma Rice, daughter of David L.
Rice, and sister of Austin. In her p1etition for distribution
she asserted to the court that the land described by her
therein as Austin's devise was all that was devised to
Austin under the will, -consisting sh-e asserted of 27.71
acres more or less. Austin contends that she omitted
from her petition land devised to him, a;s well as water
ap·purtenant to the land specified in th·e petition for distribution. T·he court decreed to Austin only the land,
without water, described in the petition for distribution.
The land involved is situated on upp;er Highway 91 in
Farmington. The land decreed Austin is west of upper
Highway 91 and extends west to lower Highway 91
known respectively as No. 1 and No. 2 of Highway 91.
The west portion of the decreed tract was deeded by
David L. Rice years before his death to the State as a
part of Highway 91, No. 2, and running across the decreed tract through the lower central p~art i~s the right
of way of the Bamherge~r Railroad, also deeded by David
L. Rice befo-re his death. So that actually the land decreed to Austin is 25 acres plus, instead of 27 acres
plus. Across the street to the east from the decr;eed land
are three P1lus acres with a barn on them and enclosed
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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with a fence. This land and barn were used by Austin
during his father's lifetime and after his father's death
for his cattle and farm implements, and these premises
are the only ones available to Austin for these purposes.
They were omitted from the p~etition for and decree of
distribution.
To the north of the decreed land and running ea:st
and west is Davis Creek which aris~es in the mountains
to the east of upper Highway 91. Running ·south from
Davis Creek and paralleling at some distance east of
the east line of upper Highway No. 91 is what is known
as White Ditch which runs s.outh in a cement ditch,
crosses west under Highway 91 through an imp·ervious
culvert and branches off north and south to serve one
farm north of Austin Rice and the Austin Rice prop~erty.
Austin contends that his farm was s.erved throughout
the years with 10 hours of water from Davis. Creek
through the White Ditch and that they were water rights
appurtenant to the dec~eed land which his sister, Erma.,
refused to recognize. He asked the court to decree him
the omitted land on the east of the highway where the
barn was located and the water rights through the White
Ditch. The defendant at all times denie9. and she ~still
does deny that Austin had any right to the barn prop~
erty or that th·ere is any water appurtenant to the decreed
land from Davis Creek through the White Ditch. Upon
these issues the trial court gave Austin Rice four hours
of \va;t,er instead of the ten claimed hy him- and denied
him th-e barn and corral prop~erty. From such a decree
both parties have app·ealed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 16 1944 David L. Rice of Farmington,
'
'
Utah, executed his last will and testament, (R.. 13-16).
He died at Farmington, Utah, some ten months later, on
F~ebruary 14, 1945, (R. 1). Apparently he wa;s ill at the
time he made his will for i't was dictated to his attorney,
Mr. Budge, from his sick bed, (T. 233). His will was admitted to probate April 7, 1945, (R.. 12), and on the same
day letters testamentary were issued to the de£endant,
Erma Rice, appointing her e:x:ecutrix of the estate, (R.
17). On DecembeT 12, 1945, the ~exeeuirix filed her first
and final account and petition for distribution, (R. 3853), and on December 26, 1945, the court entered decree
of distribution in aecordance with the petition for distribution, (R. 58-64).
The will, ( R. 13), provided, among other things, as
follows:

III.
''I give and bequeath to my son Austin Rice
the land, ap~proximately 27 acres in Section 31,
Township 3 North, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, now occupied by him, which shall be his full
distributive share of my estate and he shall not
have any other or additional share or participate
in any distribution thereof. ''
After the above devise to the plaintiff Austin Rice
' in certain'
the will p:rovided for a life estate for the wife
prop·erty, a bequest of $4,000.00 to a son, L,eGrande Rice,
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and then after the death of the wife all the remainder
of the property to eight children exclusive of the plaintiff
but inclusive of the defendant. So that under the will
all that the plaintiff, Austin Rice, got was the land he
occupied, whereas, L'eGrande got $4,000.00 plus an eighth
of the remainder of the estate, and the defendant and her
other brothers and sisters each got an eighth of the remainder of the estate.
It will shed some light on the intentions of the testator to examine the inventory and ap·praisement and the
petition for distribution in order to determine what each
heir received under the will. Therie, are two inventories,
(R. 18-23 and R. 26-31), supplemented hy stipulation,
(R. 35, 36), which show that the gross estate for inheritance tax purposes was $41,899.70. The inventory used
for State Inheritance Tax purpos-es shows that the land
decreed hy the decree of distribution to Austin Rice, the
plaintiff, (R. 60) was valued at $3,350.00 with w·ater
rights, (R. 28, 29). It will be noted that the appraisement
de~scribes the land with all wate~r rights pertaining thereunto, (R. 29) ; whereas, the decree of distribution, (R.
60), and the petition f.or distribution, (R. 41), make no
mention of water rights. The barn and corral prop~erty
was appraised at $170.00. (R. 29). Using the figure
$41,899.70 as the gross ~estate for inheritance tax purposes and deducting therefrom $3,350. 00, the value of
Austin Rice's p1rop,erty, and the $4,000.00 decreed to
LeGrande Rice, leaves an ·estate 'Of $34,549.70 to he~ divided among the eight children exclusiv'e· of Austin Rice,
or app~roxirnately $4,320.00 each, nearly $1,000.00 more
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than AuHtin receiv;ed. Actually, as shown hy the p·etition
for distribution, the total estate amounted to $52',424. 70.
(R. 53), which after deducting Austin's and LeGrande's
aforesaid amounts :~eft $45,000.00 or $5,632.00 each to be
distributed to the eight children other than Austin. This
is nearly $2,200 more for each of them than received by
Austin if the land decreed to him ha:d carried water with
it. The land decreed to Austin was of little value and a
third of it of no value without water. Without water eight
to twelve acres of th·e best land would be no good for
farming purposes, and the remainder of it good only for
pasture, and even the p·asture required irrigation in the
spring, (T. 89-91).
In the petition for distribution, (R. 40, 41), the defendant advrs·ed the court that the land described therein
was all that Austin was entitled to under the will, as follows:
"That by said Last Will and Testament, said
decedent devised :
* ***
"(b) Unto his son, Austin Rice, as his full
and only distributive share of said decedent's estate, the following described p~roprerty located in
Farmington, Davis County, State of Utah tovvit: '' (Describing the decreed land.)
'
The decree of distribution follows the petition, (R.
60). In neither is· there any mention of any water, nor
of the barn and corral prop.erty. The defendant under
oath represented to the court that the sp·ecified land
without water was all that Austin was entitled to and

'
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the court upon this representation decrHed only that
land and 'vithout 'vater to Austin. From both inventories
and appraisement, (R. 18 and R. 26), and from the petition for distribution, (R. 38), and the decree of distribution, (R,. 58), it appears that every p~iece of property described in the inventories as having water rights pertaining thereto was likewise described in defendant's petition for distribution, except the land decreed to Austin
R.ice. There are nine pieces of p~roperty in the inventories
described as having water rights including the two pieces
decreed to Austin, but in the petition for distribution and
the decree o~ distribution Austin's parcels are the only
ones with the water rights omitted. All the other seven
are deS'cribed with the water rights. In other words, the
defendant included the water rights in all lands that came
to her as trustee for distribution to her and the other
children but left out any re£erence to water rights in the
land that went to Austin, despite the fact that they were
inventoried and the value placed up:on them with appurtenant water rights.
On October 16, 1946, (R. 65) Austin Riee p~etitioned
the court to amend the decree of distribution to include
his water rights and to include the land across the
street from the decre,ed land upon which his barn and
corrals weve located. This is. ~es'Crihed in the inventory,
(R. 29), by two descriptions and as being worth $150.00
and $20.00 respectively, up'on the petition for distribution and by the ·decree of ·distribution, (R. 38 and R. 63),
this land w~as deereed to the defendant, as trustee, for t'he
benefit of herself and the· other children-.Ja value of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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$21.00 each ltio them, but to Austin an essenti~al ~and integral part of his fa.rm.
Austin Rice's first petition was predicated upon the
theory that ·the executrix occupied a fiduciary rielationship to Austin and purpos·ely omitted his water rights to
the decreed land and purposely omitted the land across
the street upon which was. located his corral and barns,
and that because of the fidueiary relationship he was entitled to have the decree amended to include the omitted
property. 'To this p.etition ther.e was a demurrer which
was sustained by the court, and Austin was given permission to amend. He filed an amended p;etition, (R. 75).
This petition was based upon the original theory of a
fiduciary relationship and also upon the theory of misr·epresentations. by means of which he had been deprived
of his day in court. The demurrer was sustained to this
petition. It was dismissed, and the ap~peal to this court
followed with the decision now appearing at 182 Pac.
( 2) 111, supra.
THE TESTIMONY AT THE TRIAL
1

In order that this Court may- clearly visualize the
errors herein it is necessary to present the :vecord in
some detail.
The Abstract of Title, Exhibit "B" at Entry No.
10, dis-closes that the deceased, David L. Rice, acquired
three acres of the decreed p;roperty in 1909 and that
the three acres carried with it water and water rights.
At entry No. 17 appears the deed for 24 pJus of the
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acres decreed to Austin and 2.10 acres across the street
which 'vere omitted from the decree. This land was
acquired in 1902 by David L·. Rice, together with water
and \Vater rights. Entry No. 40 of the Abstract shows
that David L. Rice acquired 1.75 of the acres in dispute,
without specific mention of water rights, in 1906. Entries No. 43 and 46 show the deeds from David L. Rice to
the Bamberger Railroad in 1909 and to Davis County in
1932 for the Railroad Right of Way and Highway '91,
No. 2, respectively. Entry No. 47 is the decree of dis'tribution to Austin showing only the land to the \Vest of
upp~r Highway 91 without water; whereas, all of the
decreed land had been acquired with \Vater. The plat
in the back of the Abstract shows the decreed land to
the \Vest of the highway with the Railroad Right-of-Way
and the lower Highway 91 and also the land to the east
of the highway which was omitted from the p·etition
for and decree of distribution. Actually Austin was decreed only 25 acres of la~d instead of 27 acres, more or
less, and was not decreed the land upon which his barn
or corral were located which it is claimed he occupied
at the time of his father's death.
Exhibits "F" and "G" are the tax notices to
Austin showing that the acreage in the land decreed to
him is actually 25.24 acres and not 27.71 acres, more or
less, as recited in the petition for distribution, (R. 41),
and the decree of distribution, (R. ·60).
Exhibit "C" is a plat drawn by Clifford Hughes
showing the lands covered by the decree of distribution
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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10
the tax notices, and the actual survey by the fence lines.
This ·exhibit shows that the land actually decreed to
Austin is 2 and a fraction acres less than recited in
the decree of distribution.
Exhibit "D" is an exhibit showing the land to the
east occupied by the barn and corral and is a rough
measurement of the acreage within the fence lines. It
shows slightly more acreage within the fence lines than
i.s claimed by Austin and can be accounted for by the
fact that it was only a rough survey. Mr. Hughes made
this survey and diagram and also Exhibit ''E'' which
roughly shows the course of Davis Creek, the White
Ditch taking off southerly from Davis Creek, the upper
North Ditch, and the way the White Ditch crosses the
highway and serves the Austin Rice farm on the south
end of it west of the highway. These Exhibits '' C'',
"D" and "E" were testified to by Mr. Hughes at pages
5 to 13 of the testimony.
Mr. Hughes is secretary of Davis Creek water users,
which is unincorporated (T. 10) and lives right south
of the Davis Creek and his mother is the first user on
the White Ditch. He is approximately one-half a mile
north of .Austin Rice, so that the water runs through
the Whit·e Ditch approximately one-half a mile in order
to reach Austin Rice, (T. 5, 12). .After Mr. Hughes'
mother, the first user on the White Ditch comes Clyde
.
'
Wilcox, Roy White, Gunder Newman, or his successor,
then across the str.eet west of the highway and north of
Austin Rice, Harry Kambertis, then Austin Rice south
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of Kambertis. Formerly Lunds used the water S'outh
of the . .\ustin Rice place, but they sold their water some
time ago, (T. 12-13).
David L. Rice owned 32 shares of water in the
Davis Creek. 'The water from this creek was handled hy
Davis Creek water users. Davis Creek water users originated as early as 1898, and their records in 1915 show
David Rice as owning 29 shares. He acquired three more
after that time, making a total of 32, and at the time of
his death he owned 32 shares, (T. 13-15). Each share of
stock represents one hour p,er week of the use of the
entire flow of Davis C:veek, (T. 20). The White Ditch
\Yas cemented its full length on the east side of the highway in the early 1930's, after it was washed out by
floods. The cemented ditch follows the old diteh line
-and crosses the highway in an impervious culvert under
the road, (T. 27). 'The David Rice family took water
from Davis Creek both through the White Ditch to the
south and through the North Ditch to the north. The
only land of D·avis Rice south of Davis Creek to be
served by the White Diteh is the Austin Rice farm,
(T. 18, 19).
Plaintiff's. Exhibits '' H' ', ''I'' and '' J' ', received,
( T. 295), and defendant ':S Exhibits 2 and 3, received,
(T. 244), ar·e five ap·plications made by David L. Rice
for underground water claims in the State Engineer's.
Office. Exhibit "H'' is for a well on the southeast
corner of the decreed property commenced in 1928 and
completed in 1928 as a supiJ~lement to a drain and as a
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· L. R.1ce ' s " -canyon water" · This
supplement to David
well was never used as we shall point out later on. Exhibit "I" is for a well for stock watering purposes on
the lower part of the decr·eed land and is one of two
wells drilled in 1934 within a few fe·et of each other for
pasture lands. Exhibit "J" is the other of the two
stock watering wells. Exhibit 2 is for a drain to drain
the well shown in Exhibit ''H'' and runs from the well
on the southeast corner of the decreed property across
the property as will be hereinafter des-cribed. Def·endant's Exhibit No. 3 is for a third stock watering well and
was begun and completed in 1934 and is located at the
same point and is apparently the same well as described
in Exhibit ''I''. These Exhibits show three stock watering wells on the lower part of the decreed property, all
of them commenced and completed in 1934, a well on
the southeast corner of the decreed prope-rty which would
be the well near the highway, and the drain running from
this well. It is significant to note that this well dug in 1928
and filed on in 193'6 according to David L. Rice is to supplement his canyon water. The only canyon water is that
from Davis Creek. The right was in existence according
to this filing prior to 1928 for use on the land to the west
of the highway.
Defendant's Exhibit No. 1 is a map received in
evidence, (T. 153), which shows the lands owned by
David L .. Rice, some of which W·ere said to he· served
by Davis Creek. It is difficult to determine how the
trial court came to the ~conclusion in his memorandum
decision ·that David L. Rice had 64 acres of land InSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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eluding 8 acres on the Aus-tin Rice tract that needed irrigation from his 32 hours of water, (R. 119), and then
in his findings of fact No. 8, ('R. 123), found that David
L. Rice irrigated from 60 to 70 acres north of Davis
Creek from his 32 hours and did not use any of the 32·
hours until Austin Rice took up his residence in 1937 on
the decreed tract, after which time part of the 32. hours
was used to irrigate 8 acres of Austin's land, (R. 124).
As a ma:tter of fact, from the map., Exhibit 1, and
the testimony of LeGrande Rice, the witness who testified to the specific acreage watered, it is hard to tell
what acreage of David L. Rice received water through
the North Ditch from Davis Creek, and so far as this
case was concerned it is irnrna:terial. That was not an
issue in the case. From the testimony of LeGrande
Riee, (T. 154-158), it appears that there were either
51, 59, 64 or 78 acres of David L. Rice watered from
Davis Creek, excluding the Austin Rice tract. LeGrande
testified, ('T. 157), that they never took any wa:ter out
of the Davis Creek to use on the Austin Rice tract. So
according to him the Austin Rice tract had none of the
32 hours, and it was. all useq on land to the north, and
whether or not there wer·e 31, 37 or 45 acres on the Rawl
Rice place, ( T. 154), 3, 5 or 8 acres on the Ezra Fos-s
Richards place or any a'Creag,e on the Glover field, (T.
155, 156, 157), is hard to tell. In one place he says therie
were 8 acres of the Glover field irrigated, ( T. 155), and
in another place he said they didn't water any of it except with early wa:ter, (T. 172). On cross examination
he testified that through the North Ditch they watered
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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adequately 30 acres with 14 to 16 hours but that most
of it was in orchard· tha:t was never watered, (T. 172),
which leaves the testimony meaningless, and the rest
of the water they would run over to the Rawl Rice pro..
perty which consisted of 31 acres, (T. 172). We get no
help either from Exhibit 1. However, Austin Rice in his
affidavit supporting his motion for a new trial declared
that none of the land north of Davis Creek was watered
from Davis Creek prior to 1921 because the North Ditch
wasn't built until then, (R. 140), and this is not disputed
by the defendant in her affidavit, (R. 146).
The trial court did not believe LeGrande Rice or
any other of defendant's witnesses who testified that
there was no water from Davis Creek used on the Austin
Rice tract, and it can't be determined from the testimony
what part of David L. Rice's 32 hours was used on land
other than Austin Rice's, which land it was, when the
use commenced, whether the water was appurtenant to
the land, or whether it was used by David L. Rice at the
·time of the will or at the time of his death. To assume
anything from LeGrande Rice's evidence as to the
acreage watered from Davis Creek would be pure guesswork and also, outside of any issues of this cas-e. As to
the Austin Rice tract, hi'S, testimony is untrue and was
not belie¥ed by the trial court.
The court did not heli~eve those witnesses who testified that no water from Davis Creek was used through
the White Ditch on the Austin Rice place and decreed
Austin four hours per week.
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We shall discuss separately testimony 'vith reference
to the water right and the testimony with reference to
the omitted property involving the omitted barn and
corral.
THE TESTIMONY WITH REFERENCE TO·
THE WATER RIGHT
First it may be advisable to consider def-endant's
evidence concerning the water right, and her reasons for
omitting it from her petition for distribution. The defendant offered the testimony of eight witnesses including herself, three of whom were her brothers who stand
to profit if the deeree of distribution remains as it is
and who 'villlose if the decree is amended as prayed for
in the petition of the app·ellant, Austin Rice. One of the
other witnesses for defendant is a nephew and one is a
cousin. The testimony of all of them will be stated.
It may be advantageous first to eonsider the testimony of the defendant and see from her own lips what
she intended to do, what her frame of mind was at the
time she petitioned for distribution and at the time of
the trial. She stated that she told Austin that under the
will he was only left the p~rop1erty below the road and
not the barn, (T. 231); that at the time she presented
her petition for distribution she lrn.ew there was no water
right and never had been any water right on the Austin
Rice place except drainage water; that there was no
water right at all from Davis Creek, (T. 232); that in
presenting the petition for distribution to the court and
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securing the decree of distribution as it now reads she
was the one who determined what the facts should be
as to the water and the· land occupied by Austin, (T. 233).
She further testified that the p·etition for distribution
purposely left out the water right ~even though it was
included in the inventory of the land, and that she didn't
petition the court to distribute the land to Austin with
water rights pertaining thereto and didn't call the court's
attention to the omission because she knew there wasn't
any water there---she didn't call any of this to the
court's attention, (T. 235).
Erma Rice testified that she read the will to Austin
and that Austin was in the court room at the time the
decree of distribution was entered and remained until the
proceedings were concluded, ( T. 232). Her testimony
with reference to the barn and corral land we shall refer
to later on in this brief. We shall also later on refer to
her specific denial of conversations Austin and his wife
claimed she had with them concerning the water right.
To sup,port her story that there was no water fron1
Davis Creek appurtenant to the Austin Rice land she
called as witnesses her three ·brothers, Rawl S. Rice,
James S. Rice, LeGrande Rice, iand her nephew, Rawl
Rice; also the three other witnesses referred to abov·e.
Rawl S. Rice, defendant's first witness stated that

'

he had been familiar with the Austin Rice· p·roperty up
until 1929; that there used to he a ditch running south
from Davis Creek towards the Austin Rice p·roperty
known as the White Ditch, and that never was any water
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diverted fron1 Davis Creek through the vVhite Ditch to
irrigate the Austin Rice property; that the Austin Rice
property had springs on it and drains, (T. 107-110). He
pointed out on Exhibit 1 a circle in the southeast corner
of the Austin Rice property vvhich he said was a spring.
Whether a well was dug he couldn't say, (T. 110). This
spring is the well for which ap;plication was made by
David L. Rice as shown by Exhibit "H" which David
L .. Rice said was dug in 1928, the year before the witness, Rawl S. Rice, left the prop·erty. He said there was
a s-econd sp.ring which he marked on Exhibit 1 with
the letter "A" a little above the center of the Austin
Rice p-roperty but this ·spring was boxed in. There· was
another spring which he marked with the letter ''B''
and one which he marked with the letter '' C''; that the
drain started with a culvert under the Bamberger Railway and generally described the drain as shown in red
on Exhibit 1 marked 1, 2 and 3, ( T. 111, 112.) ; that the
drains were 2112 to 3 feet deep and were dug to get the
water off the land. He then described a most unusual
system of irrigating by digging up the drains, plugging
them with sa;cks and letting the water overflow, (T. 113),
and again rep·eated that the Austin Rice land was never
served by the White Ditch, (T. 119), but qualified his
testimony later on by saying that after he left. the place
in 1929 he does.n 't know what his father or Austin did
with reference to bringing water from Davis Creek
through the White Ditch to the Austin Rice property but
imagined they us·ed the White Ditch, (T. 124). With
reference to irrigating by the drains, Raw! S. Rice also
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stat·ed that the drains were
( T. 126), and th'at the wells
All of this was years after
property with appurtenant
1

put in about 1925 or 1926,
were dug in 1934, ( T. 128).
David S. Rice acquired the
water rights.

James S·. Rice t~estified he was familiar with the
property up to 1939 (T. 130) and after that time had had
contact with it; that only occasionally was water used
from Davis Creek on the Glover field, tract 9 in Exhibit
1, (T. 132). Rawl Rice testified to the same thing; that
probably half of the Glover field was nev;er irrigated,
(T. 114). (The trial court must have included the Glover
tract to reaeh a total of 60 to 70 acres watered north of
Davis Creek.) James S. Rice stated that he never knew
of anyone using water through the White Ditch for the
irrigation of the Austin Rice place, (T. 133). He then
described the thr·ee springs and the drains, ( T. 134,
135), and stated that the irrigation was by drains, (T.
138). He never saw his father use water out of the well
near the highway which was dug in 1928, (T. 142). He
admitted that the White Ditch goes past Austin's place
and down further, but he knows that Austin never got
water out of the White Ditch from 1937 up~ to the present time, (T. 145). This witness. was very evasive, but
the for,egoing is the material substance of his testimony.
LeGrande Rice went into great detail in describing
how the Austin Rice land was irrigated by drains. He
testified that he knew the land all his life up, to 1945;
that they would irrigate from the drains by digging up
a section of tile, plug up the drain and then the water
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\vould run down five rows at a time, (T. 158); that they
\Yould block the drains up after digging them up and
back the water up about 25 rods. They would plug up
the drain about every fifty feet and let the water run
on the rows and take th·e saek out, run it another fifty
feet and do that alternately until the irrigation was completed; that the drain was about 31;2 to 4 feet deep, and
that this generally started in :11ay; that the rows were
about thirty rods long, and it took ·eight 'Or nine hours
to a row, and he could water 25 or 30 rows at a time,
and five acres in three or four days; that eleven acres
would take ten or eleven days, etc., (T. 176-180). This
witness testified that the drain on the Glove-r property
can't water the Glover property to the north hecaus~e.
the ground is too high, and when the ground is high, you
can't water from a drain, ( T. 17 4). He had no trouble,
however, in watering Austin's high ground from Austin's
drain. Counsel for defendant endeavored to have the
eourt make a finding that irrigating on the Austin Rice
p~lace was done by means of drains in this fantastic manner. We objected to any such find~g upon the grounds
that the drains -couldn't possibly affect the easterly portion of the land, and that the drains were not a feasible
method of irrigation. 'The court struek out the attempted
finding with reference to irrigating by means of drains,
( R. 138), ·and o bvious.Iy ·di~d nut believe the wiltn~esses
who testifi.ed to this absurd rigamarole. The court also
struck out defendant's attempt to have the findings recite that the defendant read the will to the plaintiff and
he expressed satisfaction with the pro~sions n1ade for
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him, (R.. 138). L,e.Grande Rice also testified as did the
other witn,esses before him that his father had 32 hours
of water from Davis Creek, (T. 153), and that up to 1945
they never did any irrigating except by the drains; that
he ·never knew of his father or brothers ever taking
water from the White Ditch unless it was surplus water;
that never when the water was on turns was water taken
from ·Davis Creek through the White Ditch to the
Austin Rice property, (T. 157). He admitted, how·ever,
that Lund, whose place is south of the Austin Rice
place, had two shares from Davis Creek, and that the
water did· come down to the Lund pJace; that the White
Ditoh did ·carry water pa'st the Austin Riee place, (T.
161) ; that the place north of Austin Rice's, the Sabin
place, now known as the Kamhertis place·, did have water
running down through the White Ditch, (the -cement
ditch) the last time he was there three or four years
ago, (T. 161, 162). He admitted, however, that Austin
did run surplus water from the Davis Creek almost every
year until the water went on turns, sometimes as late
as July; that he did have a surplus right in the White
Ditch almost every year from year to year, (T. 165),
and that Austin did use water from the White Ditch on
his pla.ce; that the ditch now ends at Austin's, (T. 166),
about the middle of the field at the top end, (T. 167).
He stated that the David L. Rice 32 hour turn starts
Tuesday night at 9 :00 and ends Thursday morning at
5:00, (T. 170).
The next witness for the defendant was Rawl Rice
'
a grandson of David L. Rice, and a nephew of the de'
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fen dan t. He was 29 years old at the time of the trial,
said he had been familiar with the David L. Rice farms
around Farmington all his life up· until 1939 which
would be until he was about 20 years old, and then the
last two years he had worked on th~em, (T. 189, 190);
that he had helped to take care of the Aus.tin Rice property; that he neve-r knew of any water being taken
through the White Ditch to the Austin Rice place from
his grandfather's 32 hours of water or any other water
through the White Ditch. He was. in the war from 1942
to 1946, (T. 192). He was in the war when the will was
made and when David Rice died, and for several y·ears
p~rior to that. This witness admitted that Austin. Rice
used surplus water from the Davis Creek and that he had
trouble with Austin in 1946 over the water; that Austin
claimed he had ten shares. of water from the Creek, and
Erma said there was no water going to Austin, to help
him out with the early water, but when she needed it
or the other farms needed it, not to let him have any;
that Austin went ahead and took the water and then
arrangements were made for him to take it until they
could find out for sure whose it was; that this is the
only time there was ever any trouble with Austin over
the water, and the only time during his acquaintance with
the property when there had been any trouble, and that
it all arose after the death ·of David L. Rice and after
the decree of distribution, ( T. 192, 194) ; that the time
he had the trouble was in August, 1946. This witness
said he never knew of Austin taking any water through
the White Ditch up to 1939, (T. 196).
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Roy White, a cousin of the defendant, (T. 202), 54
years old, testified that he lived about one quarter of a
mile north ·of the Austin llice. p·roperty all his life and
was familiar with Davis Creek. He stated that on the
\Vhite Ditch immediately adjoining Davis Creek to the
south was the Hughes prop~erty, next wa;s the Wilcox
property, then came his own property, and then immediately adjoining him on the south was the S. E. White
p·roperty now occup~ied by s'Ome peop~le named Newman;
that beyond the }~·ewman prop~erty was the Kamhertis
prop·erty which is across the street on the west. The
next was the farm of David L. Rice pu.rchased by him
from Stephenson, (T. 198, 199). Contrary to defendant and her other witness·es he testified that he had seen
J?avid L. Rice take early water through the White Ditch
to the Austin Rice farm all through his teen years from
1910 to 1919, ( T. 199) ; that then a flood came down the
White Ditch and nobody got water down the Whit~e
Ditch in the 1918 season; that the following s.eason,
1919, they set out to reestablish the ditch, and he and
David Rice talked the situation over about getting the
early water down, and he and David Rice went to work
on the ditch, and that Rawl Rice worked on the ditch;
that they had a good deal of difficulty and it washed
out faster than they could get it in, and that Da:vid 1 .
Rice said, "You take the water, I give it up." (T. 200);
that he never saw David Rice take the water after that;
that he has no recollection of seeing any of the Rices take
water from the ~itch to the Austin Rice fa.rm over a
long period of time, pos'Sibly up until the last year or
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so, and that would apply to any vvater vvhatsoever, high
water or turns. The VVhite Diteh was cemented in 1934,
( T. 201). On cross examination he stated that he vvas
a\Yay from the prop~erty quite a bit from 1935 to 1943;
that his turn to use the \Yater comes in at 6 :30 on Thursday evening and continues until noon, so that if Austin
had a turn from 7 :00 the previous night to 5 :00 Thursday morning, that would be in the middle of the night,
and there would be no occasion for.him to see whether
Austin took the water or not, ( T. 207). In spite ·of this,
he still insists that Austin did not take any water until
the last year. He never saw him taking any high water,
(T. 207, 208). The high water is the surplus water that
runs in high water season, -commencing in April and
up sometime towards the end of June, (T. 204, 205). It
later dev.eloped that he took his water from D-avis Creek
through another source than the White Ditch and only
used the White Ditch about four hours a week 'Since 1934,
that is. from 6 :30 to 10:30 Thursday night he would be
on the White Ditch, but not after that, (T. 213).
,,·
i

~~

Mr. Valance C. Glover next testified that he had
lived in Farmington all his life and was familiar with
Davis Creek and the ditches leading out of the south side
of it including the White Ditch; that he owns property
south of the Austin Rice piece, (T. 213, 214), the p~ro
perty formerly owned by Mr. Lund. He had never seen
in the last 25 years any one watering the Austin Rice
prop~erty from the Whit~e Ditch. 25 years ago he noticed 1\fr. David L. Rice using the water in the flush part
of the season, but at no other 'tim-e until the last two
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years, ( T. 216). The Rices irrigated their farm from
the drains. In the last two years Austin has used water
from the White Ditch, but he has never seen Austin use
water from the White Ditch other than in the last two
years, ( T. 219). He, the witness, doesn't need water
from the White Ditch-he has wells and springs, (T.
220, 221). David Rice used water out of the White Ditch
up until1930, (T. 222).
Clyde Wilcox testified that he was 5a years old and
lived in South Farmington all his life ·except from 1914
to 1924; that he was familiar with Davis Creek and the
..._L\_ustin Rice place, with the White Ditch and the persons
'vho took water from it; that he has a water right from
Davis Creek of 24 shares; that his land is about one-half
block south of Davis Creek; that he never knew of David
Rice using water from the White Ditch for irrigation
on Austin Rice's p·roperty; never saw him take water
out of the ditch; never saw any of the Rice family using
any water from Davis Creek through the White Ditch,
(T. 227-229).
Thus, it app·ears from defendant's witnesses that
some of them testified that neither Austin or his father
ever used any water out of Davis Creek through the
White Ditch, and others teglttified that they both us·ed
it. The Rice family, however, ineluding the defendant
were very positive that there was no water right from
Davis Creek for the Au'stin Rice place, although one of
the brotlh·ers did 'admit th,a·t his fiather and Austin used
surplus water.
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On behalf of the plaintiff Clifford Hughes te:stified.
He is an employee of the State Engineer's Office, (T. 4),
resides in Farmington about one-half a mile north of
the Austin Rice property on the east side of the street,
(T. 5). His mother owns the property right next south
of Davis Creek through which the White Ditch flows,
(T. 12). He is the secretary of the Davis Creek Water
Users Company which is an unineorporated comp,any,
(T. 10). The prop~erty served by the White Ditch is,
first his mother's, then Clyde Wilcox, then Roy White,
then Gunder Newman, then across the street Harry
Kambertis which is just north of Austin Rice, then
Austin Rice, and formerly Rasmus Lund's estate south
of Austin Rice. They all get water from the White Ditch
which in turn comes from Davis Creek, (T. 13). He was
born and rais~ed in the location where he now lives, hut
he doesn't pretend that he kept track of where the water
was being used from the W'11ite Ditch other than that of
his mother, ( T. 15, 16). He has, however, sHen water
turned into the White Ditch by the Rice family, and
there was no David Rice land other than the Austin
Rice farm that eould be served by the White Ditch.
David Rice took his 32 hours consecutively in the middle
of the week. The Austin Rice farm has been farmed as
long ·as he can remember with various kinds of crops.
·'

which could not have been matured without water. The
kind that required water have been on there and have
matured, and there is no other source of surface irrigation water for Austin Rice's: traet west of the highway
except Davis Creek through the White Ditch. He has
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seen Austin Rice using wa.ter from the White Ditch for
the last three or four ye~..rs and prior to that time, and
he has seen the water taken out on the Austin Rice
land both at high water and when the water was on
turns, (T. 23, 24). He never saw David Rice personally
take water out from any of the ditches either north or
south of Davis Creek, (T. 25). The water goes on turns
according to the season, generally in June. Prior to
going on turns the p~eople who had water rights helped
themselves by arrangem·ent with the water master, ('T.
25). Austin Rice took water through the White Ditch
in the early 30's when the ditch was washed out. He
took the water across the Hughes' place when the ditch
was washed out. This was water from Davis Creek. Then
the cement ditch was put in, (T. 28). He has seen Austin
Rice turn water into ,the White Ditch from Davis Creek
in the irrigation season, ( T. 29, 30), and he was also one
of the first to get early water through the ditch. His observation has been such as any neighbor would make.
He has not be-en p·articularly int·erested one way or
another, (T. 30-31).
Irvin Hughes, 48 years of age, testified he lived right
south of Davis Creek east of the highway. The White
Pi·tch .comes right through 'their p-roperty; that he has
lived there all his life and is familiar with the Austin
Rice place to the west of the highway; that water from
Davis Creek through the White Ditch has been us~ed
on the Austin Rice place for as long back as he can remember; that David Rice turned the water down into
the ditch, and he has also se~en A ust.in use it in the last
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fe"~

years since he has been living on the property; that
Austin used it all during the summer and also for early
crops. He used the water after it was on shar~es. He
also used it while his father was living, and about three
years ago Austin got s-cared by a rattlesnake when he
was going up the ditch. That was in July; that his recollection of the us~e of water on the Austin Rice place from
Davis Creek dat.es back to the time when he was a very
young boy, (T. 268-272). In fact, Austin flooded them
out a couple of times by letting the ditch get clogged,
and it pretty near washed the cement ditch out. ThiB
occasion was about five years ago. There was no other
place for the David L. Rice water to go hut to the Austin
Rice farm, (T. 273, 274). The water had gone on shares
when this clogging of the ditch occurred. The water goes
on shares sometimes in April but most years in May or
June, (T. 275).
David R. Lund, Sr., 56 years old, testified he was
familiar with the Austin Rice place, formerly owned
by David L. Rice, on the west side of the highway; that
he lived next door south, and that before David L. Rice
bought the Austin Rice place Lund's father rented it
for two years, and he has been familiar with it ev~er
since-that's since 1897 or 1898. He was familiar with
the Austin Rice farm up until 1915. He went to Salt
Lake from 1915 to 1921 and then stayed on the farm
south of Austin's until 1923 at his father's p~lace. The
cem~ent ditch was built in 1934, and he has known about
the property since the cement ditch was built, (T. 278).
From his earliest recollection the Rice property got
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their irrigation water out of Davis Creek through the
ditch running along the ~east side of the road, thence
across the road just north of the Rice property, and
the Rices took the water when it was surplus and also
n1ost any time they wanted to use it, but after the first
of May, the water was rotated, and it was taken then
once a vveek, and it was used all summer long. Mr. David
L. Rice to'Ok it 'and took it dorwn to Mr. Lund's father's
place whose turn -came after David L. Rice, and Lund
took the water off of David L.. Rice. They had the
water all the time they were there. Since 1934 he has
not been familiar with the ditch. They moved away from
the property, but prior to that time David L. Rice used
the water as above indicated, (T. 278-281). Mr. Lund
had three hours of water on his place, and in the last
part of the season not very much of it came· down, but
David Rice irrigated the Austin Rice land with water
·from Davis Creek the whole season of the year once a
vveek. He knows how often the water was used because
they took the water after Rice. This was every year from
1908 to 1915 once a week. It would be running down on
the Rice field when he went to get it in his turn, (T. 280,
281, 282). The upp~er p.art of the David L. Rice (Austin
Rice) farm had no drains in it. The drains were on the
lower end of the farm. He distinctly remembers from
the time he was a little boy six or seven years. old, when
his father leased the p~rope-rty before Rice acquired it
and later purchased th~ adjoining p~rop,erty, that the
water was used on the Austin Rice farm from Davis
Creek, (T. 282, 283). Mr. Lund. had also seen David
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Rice's boys watering with the Davis Creek water, and
in 1934 David L. Rice and the witness's father tried to
get them to cement the ditch down past their property,
and the p ersons cementing it wouldn't do it. (This last
testimony the court struck out, but we submit that it
was competent and it was error to strike it.) The court
felt that the evidence was immaterial because the evidenee already shows the ditch was down to the property,
( T. 286, 287) .
1

James H. l\fcQuiston testified in behalf of the plaintiff. This witness knew nothing about t4e trial or the
testimony ·of any of the other witness.es. He had never
discussed the cas-e until about an hour before he was
called to the witness stand because it was only that noon
when he hap:pened to be in Farmington and saw counsel
for the plaintiff and asked him how the Austin Rice
case was coming along. He came into -court without previous notice ( T. 290, 291). He testified that hi~. place is
approximately a mile south of Austin's place; that
Austin has worked for him for five years; that he and
Austin exchange work, and that he, McQuiston, irrigated
Austin's place two years, and tha.t the source of the
irrigation water for the Austin Riee place was from
the first mountain creek north of where he lives, ''That.
is the only source of water from the canyon north of
me that flows to the road or over the road. I don't know
the name of the creek." It is the mountain creek north
of the Rice place. It comes down a cement ditch from
the point of diversion, and he has been down the fu1l
length of the ditch and turned the water in and taken
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it to the Austin Rice place and irrigated it on the Austin
Rice p~lace, and he has seen Austin irrigate with that
water each and every year for five years (T. 287, 288).
Austin irrigated and grew on his place onions, zucchini
squash, radishes, peas, fruit trees and alfalfa hay (T.
289, 290). The Austin Rice place was irrigated from
this water in June, July and August every year for the
last five years ( T. 290). l-Ie .has stayed with Austin
when he took the water in the night ti1ne. It was not
always at night, but he has helped Austin irrigate at
night (T. 292). When Austin irrigated in the last five
years, it was in the evening because the witness worked
at the Cudahy Packing Plant and didn't get off work
until 5:30, and it was nearly 6:00 when he left, and
7 :00 when he would get home, and Austin would he
irrigating at 9:00, 10:00 or 11:00 at night when }vlcQuiston. got to his place. R·e doesn't know the exact
hours of Austin's turn. In the spring of the year Austin
got the water whenever he wanted it, and he used the
water in the evening when it went on turns (T. 291-294).
He has also seen Austin use the water in the mornings
and the afternoons.
Austin Rice, the plaintiff and appellant, and Annie
Rice, his wife, testified fully concerning the land oceupied by Austin at the time of the making of the will
and at the time of death of David L. Rice; about the
legal proceedings involving the probate of the will and
the distribution of the estate; about the water appurtenant to the ·decreed land; the nature and characteristics
of the land, and! the use made of it throughout 'the years.
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Annie Rice had been married to Austin for 17 years.
They lived four years in Centerville, three years on the
\'l1ite Place ( ,,~hich is two farms north of the land under
consideration here), and on their p·resent place since
1937, (T. 31). The tracts of land outlined in the abstract
(Ex. B) both east and \Vest is the land they have occupied
since 1937, (T. 32, 33). She has been familiar with the
land occupied by them, referred to in this brief, the west
part of it, as the Austin Rice farm), all of her married
life, and in 1944 at the time the will was made they were
occupying the same p·roperty that they now occupy.
Their house is located on the west side of Highway
91, and their barn and corral is across the street east,
( T. 33, 34) . She has been familiar with the property
since 1930. No crop·s have ever been grown on the piece
east of the road-that is just used for barn, corral and
farm implements, (T. 35). On the tract west of the
highway the tract in 1930 was in alfalfa. An orchard
was planted in 1934. David L. Rice bought the trees, and
Austin p~lanted them-peaches and ap·ricots, and they are
there now. The alfalfa was -on the place until they
moved there in 1937. In 1934 there was a crop of cucumbers of approximately an acre which were matured.
These cucumbers were irrigated out of Davis Creek
through the White Ditch, (T. 35, 36). David L.. Rice frequently visited the place when wa.ter was running on it
from Davis Creek, (T. 3'7). 'They moved onto the

p~ro

perty in 1937 at the request of David L. Rice who said,
''I will give you the place and build you a house on it,
and you can have it.'' And he did this. The house is
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there now. They moved in one week before Thanksgiving
in 1937, (T. 37). The orchard was watered from Davis
Creek. There is no other place to obtain water· for it.
Water from Davis Creek has been used on the orchard
ever since it was planted in 1934. After 1937 the alfalfa
was plowed up. Seed corn, tomatoes, carrots, parsnips,
peas, onions, potatoes and sugar beets were planted. AU
of these crops required water to mature them. They
were matured, and the water for these crops was out
of Davis Creek through the White Ditch. There was
no other source of water for them. She and Austin
always used the water ten hours every week. They had
the last ten hours of David L. Rice's turn while he was
living and with his knowledge, and he would come down
and tell them to go ahead and take the water, (T. 38, 39).
She knevv nothing about the will in 1944. At that time
they had been on the place ap,proximately seven years
using the water ten hours a week for the entire irrigation
season every year, (T. 40). They cannot get along without the water, and it is necessary for the use on tha;t
land. There is no waste in the use of ten hours, and the
ten hours is necessary to mature the crops. The lower
part of the land is all p,asture and always has been,
(T. 41). The crops have been raised on the upper part.
The first they knew about the will was after !ir. Rice
died when Erma Riee came down to the house and said
that ·Mr. Rice had given them the p~lace they now occupied. That was in the summer of 1945. She said nothing to them about reading the will. She told them that
Mr. Riee had left them the P1ace they now oecupied, and
11
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that they were well ·cared for. Erma Rice over the years
had been on the p~lace and seen the kind of crops they
"\Vere raising, lmew "\Vhat they were growing, had been
there and seen the use they were making of the property
to the east where the corral is and had remarked, ''How
do you make them cows stand still in the corner to milk
them.'' The 'vitness knew nothing about what was in
the will other than "\Vhat Erma Rice told her, (T. 41,
42, 43). 1frs. Annie Rice didn't see the will until she
came up to the courthouse, (which was in August, 1946),
and Erma Rice didn't tell her that she vvas not going to
get the water for her p·roperty nor the barn and corral
property, (T. 43, 44). The first time the witness knew
that Erma Rice was claiming they had no water was
in 1946 when Austin went up to get the water, and she
told him he didn't have any water right, (T. 44). When
the petition for distribution was set for hearing she and
Austin received a letter for Austin to appear. The witness did not go and does not know what transpired,
(T. 45).
Late in the summer of 1946 the defendant, Erma
Ric.e, told Austin and Annie they didn't have any water
right, and the witness then went to the courthouse and
read the will that David Rice had made, and that is
the first time she knew the conditions of the will. They
then checked the tax notice and found they were short
several acres according to what was bequeathed them,
(T. 46). The Bamberger Railroad and the lower Highway 91 crosses the land bequeathed to them, but they
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never did have any use of that property and never occupied it, ( T. 46).
On cross examination the witness said there were
30 trees in the orchard and there are now 24; that their
hours for watering from Davis Creek through the White
Ditch was from 7:00 P.M. Wednes,day to 5:00 A.M.
Thursday, (T. 50, 53). There are ten acres of tillable
land requiring water, and the balance of the tract is
in pasture land which is sub-irrigated, approximat·ely
18 acres. The tillable land has no springs or wells on
it ·except the well in the southeast corner which has never
been used. The tillable land is dry, (T. 57, 58). There
was a well down in the p·asture, but it is dry. All their
garden crops were raised on the ten acres of tillable land.
None of these crops w·ere ever irrigated from drains,
(T. 58). Since they went on the place none of the Rices
helped them at all. They have taken care of the place
and put up the crops themselves. Some years they
p~aid the taxes and some years David L. Rice paid them.
When the alfalfa was on the ground, there was about
seven or eight acres of it, and that was all above the
pasture, ( T. 59).
When Erma Rice told them that under the will
they received the place they now occupied, she didn't
s:ay anything about the land ~across the street not being
theirs, and she didn't say anything to them about not
getting\ any wat·er. The first time she said anything
about them not getting the place across the street or not
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getting any water 'vas after the decree of distribution
was entered which was in the fall of 1946, (T. 61).
As to wells and drains on the land, Mrs. Rice testified that there is the well in the southeast -corner that
cannot be used because the State has stopp·ed it on account of quicksand. There is water in it, but it has
never been used. The ·drains eou1dn't irrigate ~the tillable
lands because they are too low, and you couldn't pump
enough to make it worth while, (T. 64). 'Many times the
witness has seen LeGrande Rice watering the Austin
Rice farm with water from Davis Creek. In 1940 or
1941 he irrigated the sugar beets and watered them
every week. N·either she nor Austin nor any one else
that she knows of ever irrigated the Austin Rice farm
from the drains upon the farm. She never heard of
such a thing until she heard it at this trial, (T. 262, 263).
It is not possible to irrigate the land from the springs or
drains because you would have to push water up hill to
do so. They are all lower than the tillable land, ( T. 265).
The witness testified that at one time in the summer
of 1946 Erma Rice carne to their place and discussed
the Davis Creek water and said if you are going to
take any water, take it all, but ·don't split it up, but
I think you are entitled to three hours. Austin told
Erma to go and see Pat Rice, the water master, and
Erma cam·e back later; that she, the witness, was not
there at the second conversation, (T. 2·63-265). Erma
Rice denied this conversation and also denied Austin's
version of the conversation to be hereinafter set forth.
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The ease with which Austin Rice became confused
and could be imposed upon is apparent throughout his
testimony. He had great.difficulty in remembering dates
and was frequently conf.used on them. When attempting
to fix the time when he came up to court and when he
first talked to Erma about the will he said that Erma
vvas first down to his place in 1946, then said it was in
1947, and then that it was in 1943, ( T. 81, 82) ; whereas,
his father died in February of 1945. As to dates he was
uncertain, but as to events he was not uncertain. The
time when Erma first told him about the will was before the time he talked to her in the courthouse, (T. 82).
He came up to the courthous~e after he had talked to
Erma about the will. The time he talked to Erma about
the will was after his fathe·r died, (T. 82, 83). The time
he first talked to Erma was about three months after
his father died, when she told him his father had left
him this farm and it is yours, and you will be taken
care of, ( T. 84). He didn't read the will. He came up
to the court when he got a letter or a card telling him
to come, and he doesn't remember when it was, but he
came up to the eourthouse and Erma said, ''You had
just as well go home''; that he was taken care of and
there wasn't any use of his staying, so he went home,
( T. 85). There was never any question rais·ed about his
use of the water from Davis Creek after ills father died,
and he went right on using it, and no question was raised
until in the fall of 1946 after the decree of distribution
was entered, (T. 86) . Since they went on the land Erma
has seen them using the barn and the corral, (T. 87).
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At the time of the making of the will and at the
time of his fa'tlher's de~ath ·he was- occupying and using
the same land, that is the land shown on the abstract
both to th;e east and west of the road, (T. 66). The land
across the street to the east of the road is fenced and is
the same as shown on the abstract. It has been feneed
as long as he can remember, and he is 42 or 43 years
old, (finally settled on 43), ( T. 67) . He can remen1her
back when he was six or seven years old, and the land
across the street where the barn and corral are has been
fenced as long as he can remember it, (T. 68).
As to the land decreed him which is west of the
highway, he remembers that from the time he was seven
or eight years old. In the early years it was used for
pasture and hay, and for the hay the water came from
Davis Creek through the White Ditch. There were
reguiar shares of ten hours from his e:arliest recollection.
The water was used all summer long in the irrigation
and the non-irrigation season, (T. 72). The David L.
Rice turn of 32 hours started at 9 :00 Tuesday night and
runs to 5:00 Thursday morning, (T. 73). The turn for
the prop·erty decreed him is from 7 :00 Wednesday
night until Thursday at 5 :00, and that has been as long
as he can remember. Before 1926 the land was used for
hay and pasture, (T. 74). The water from Davis Creek
was used on it. There are about nine acres of land that
were .later planted in corn, sugar beets and other garden
crops. You cannot mature these crops without the Davis
Cr·eek water of ten hours, (T. 75). Alfalfa was planted
in 1932, but you have to rotate that after five years when
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it runs out, (T. 76). He went on the place in 1937 and
has always used the ten hours of water throughout the
season. Som·e of the neighbors also gaVie him water,
(Tr. 77), and he and his father frequently changed hours
of water and som~times he took the whole 32 hours,
(T. 79). He went up himself and got the water from
Davis Creek through th·e White Ditch, and he has done
that ever since he has been there,· and the lie is no other
place to get irrigation water for his land, (T. 79). The
irrigation water is neeessa.ry. You can't mature crops
on the land without it, (T. 80)0
Ther•e are about 15 or 16 acres of pasture, and it
is necessary to water the pasture grass with as much
water as you can get, but you couldn't use the 'vater
on the pasture land every year only in the early spring,
but he watered it as long as he could, (T. 89, 90). He
didn't have enough water to water it all year around,
but he did water his garden every week for ten hours
from Davis Cr·eek, (T. 90). During the years there
were 11 or 12 acres that have needed irrigating-all the
vvater they could get all through the season, (T. 91).
There are no springs on the land, but there are three
wells, two below the Bamberger and one up by the road,
and there is one drain that goes clear across the land,
(To 92). Sometimes in the late fall his father permitted
him to take all of the 32 hours, ( T 96)
0

0

When Erma told him he had been left the property
he was living on, he was satisfied, and when he went
up to the courthouse she said ev·erything was taken care
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of and there 'vas no use of his staying so he went avvay,
(T. 98, 99). He doesn't remember "\Yhat the l~etteT from
the Clerk 'vas about, but it vvas som·ething to do with the
family and that he would hear about the will through the
court. That was the time his sister told him he didn.'t
need to stay, (T. 101).
Austin Rice also testified that he had never tried to
irrigate his land by drains and that he -couldn't do so.
If he tried to water from the drains, the tile would plug
up and fill in, and over one-half of his land is higher
than the drains, and you couldn't reaeh it in any ·event.
He never savv his father use the drains to irrigate. His
father always told him to keep the drains cleaned out,
(T. 245, 246). T he S'tate s'topped them from drilling any
deeper the well on the southeast corner of his property,
and that well has never been used. Ther·e is something
like sixteen fe·et of water in it, and it took about four
days to fill it. When LeGrande watered the beets in 1930,
he got his water from the White Ditch, and his father
got the water from the White Ditch to water his beets,
(T. 247, 248). The witness testified that in the summer
of 1946 his sister came to him and said not to sp~lit the
water, if you are going to take it, take it all, and in
the same conversation she said, ''I suppose you got
three hours'', and the witness hold her to go and talk
to Pat Rice, the water master, and later she came back
and said, "I suppose you got six hours", and the witness.
told her h·e had ten hours, (T. 250, 251). Erma Rice
denied this conversation. Erma never complained about
him taking the water until the summer of 1946 after
1
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the decree of distribution. The witness took the water
all the time during 1944 and 1945 without any objection
from any one as he had done theretofore, (T. 253, 254).
She came to see him three times. The last time she
brought the sheriff, and then the witness brought this
action, ( T. 261, 262) .
THE TESTIMONY WITH REFERENCE TO
THE BARN AND CORRAL PRO,PERTY
As we have heretofore shown, the testator left to
Austin the land he now occupies, app.roximately 27 acres
in Section 31. The land decreed him omitting the Bamberger and State Road Rights of Way is slightly more
than 25 acres. The land decreed him, together with
the land across the street where th·e barn and corral
are situated actually amount to 29.09 acres. All of it
is in Section 31. The main part of the decreed land,
24.71 acres, was deeded to David L. Rice in 1902, and in
the same deed the 2.10 acres across the street were also
deeded to him. They were both p·art of the same transaction, (Exhibit '' B '', entry 17). 1% acres across the
street were deeded to David L. Rice in 1904, (Exhibit
"B", entry 40). and adjoin the above 2.10 acres.
Austin Rice testified that the land across the street
. east of the highway where his barn and corral are located has been fenced as long as he can remember. He
is 43 years old, and his memory dates hack to the time
wh~n he was six or seven years old. He used this land
from the time he moved on to the p~roperty in 1937 for
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his cows, hay, farm machinery and horses. He has no
other place to keep them, and never ha.s had. He used
and occupied the land in this manner in 1944 when the
will was written and also at the time of his father's
death, (T. 67, 69), a.nd he is still making use of the land
in the same way. There is a sp·ring under the barn that
will water the stock, and he has always used that. The
co,vs drink it, and there is no other plaee for them to·
water, and this water is necessary for the use of the
land, (T. 69, 70). Mter he moved onto the land, his
fath~er did no!t keep any of his hay in the barn. His
father was not feeding Austin's stock out of the father's
hay. The father kep't his hay back at the other barn
up the street. David L. Rice did keep some of his cattle
in the corral on occasions. Austin fed them, and his
father paid him to feed them. The father's cattle were
in the corral along with Austin's stuff. The cattle of
both of them ran together upon the mountain to the
east of the corral, and when the father's cattle were
there, Austin took care of them both in the corral and
on the mountain, (T. 70, 7~}. His father did not keep
horses or cattle in the corral or barn after Austin moved
onto the place without first consulting Austin, (T. 250),
and about four or five years before his father died his
'
father built himself a new barn, and after that his father
kept his hay and cattle over there at that place. His
father never kep't hay or cattle in Austin's barn after
the new barn was built four or five years ago, ( T. 251,
252). Erma Rice testified that the father stored some
hay in Austin's barn that was bought at Kaysville.
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Austin said his father told him to go to Kaysville and
haul this hay into the barn, and he would give him the
hay on shares, and Austin brought a check from the
Smith Canning Company and a beet check and gave it
to his father for his share of this hay, ( T. 252, 253).
(Note: This testimony of Austin's that the father never
kept his hay and cattle in Austin's barn after the father
built the new barn was not disputed by any witness.)
Annie Rice, Austin's wife, testified that the land to
the east of the road is their barn and corral, and it is
fenced in, and that they used it since 1937 as the corral
for hay and the housing of cows and horses, (T. 32);
that the cattle ran in the corral and were watered there;
that they kept their farm implements there, (T. 34), and
that there is no other place and no place on the west
of the highway for use as a corral and barn or for the
storage of their farm implements and never has been;
that the barn has always been on the east land as long
as she can remember, (T. 35). Erma Rice knew of the
us-e that the Austin Rice's made of this harn and corral
prop~erty. She has seen their horses and cows there, and
on one occasion remarked, ''How do you make those
co,vs stand still in the corner to milk them", (T. 43), and
she never said anything about Austin not receiving the
barn and eorral across the street until after the decree
of distribution, late in 1946, ( T. 44, 45). David L. Rice
took some of his ·cattle into the corral to go up onto the
mountain. David L.. Rice, however, did not use the barn
for hay to f.eed his cattle there, ( T. 55). He had kept no
machinery in the barn. He never rep~aired the barn.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

43
After they \vent on in 1937, \vhatever work was done on
the barn she and Austin did. She worked with Austin.
She helped him repair the fences as well as irrigate.
S.he helped him milk the cows and feed them, (T. 55,
56). Rawl Rice did not work on the corral or the barn
nor did David L. Rice at any time since Austin occupied
it, (T. 65). The witness di~d testify th a;t D~avid L. Riee
used the barn and the corral before she and Austin
went on the property.
1

For the defendant Rawl S. Rice testified that he
was familiar with the place where the barn is east of
the highway, ( T. 107). He left the p·rop,erty in 1929,
so the barn was there at that time, ( T. 108). That is all
he said about the barn and corral p·roperty·.
James S. Rice did not testify as to the barn and corral property.
LeGrande Rice testified that his father and Austin
kept cattle at the barn, in and about the barn; that
the father and Austin had hay there. His father repaired
the barn twice, but he couldn't say when it was, nor did
he testify contrary to Austin that after the new barn
was built up the street four or five years ago his father
made no further use of the property, (Tr. 159, 160).
As to the year when the father repaired the barn, LeGrane Rice's testimony is quite significant.
'' Q.

What year was the barn repaired by your
father~

A.

Couldn't tell you exactly what the year was.
It was when he was occupying it.
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Q. When he was occupying it. You don't lmow
when that was?
A. About two years after he went on there.
Q. When did he go on?
A.

Couldn't tell you that exactly.

Q. About two years after your father went on?
A.

No, two years after Austin went on.

Q.

Two years?

A.

About, couldn't swear whether the first or
second year.

Q. When did Austin go on?
A.

I don't know for sure, or not, '37, I think.

Q.

Then your father repaired the barn.

A.

Yes, sir." (Tr. 167).

The witness testified that he didn't know whether
or not Austin had kept up the pro:perty. He, the
witness, kept up fences and corrals when he had Dad's
stock. That was in 1931 up to 1935. Austin and his wife
helped keep the fences up and repaired them. His father
kept some of his hay there, and the father and Austin
fed some of the cattle together. He couldn't say whether
or not his father paid Austin for doing this, (T. 168).
Austin kept his farm machinery, his stock and hay at
the barn. He had no othe-r place to keep them, (T. 169).
Rawl Rice, the grandson, and nephew of defendant, was in the Army and wasn't on the property from
1942 to 1946. 'H.e was not there when the will wa:s written
nor when David L. Rice died, (T. 192). He testified that
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'vhile he was on the prop~erty his grandfather ran stock
in the corral and on the mountain and kep1t hay ther~e,
and that Austin kept cattle and hay there, (T. 191), hut
he doesn't know anything about the four years he was
away, (T. 192). He doesn't know whether or not his
grandfather paid Austin for keep~ing stock in the barn.
. .t\.ustin had no other plaee to keep his cattle or hay,
(T. 195 ).
Neither Roy White nor Clyde H. Wilcox gave any
.testimony concerning the barn or corral property.
Valance C. Glover had seen David Rice use the barn
and corral property, and he has seen LeGrande hauling
hay there from the Glover field, but no specific times
were mentioned except that David Rice was around the
property off and on up to the time of his death. This
witness did not say when he did the feeding, only that he
saw David Rice around the barn which, of course, is not
disputed, (T. 219, 220). The witness did say he couldn't
tell the years, but he, the witness, rented a piece right
across from the barn around 1930 to 1940, (T. 225).
Lately he hasn't been 'there so ·much, but as a boy he
was raise·d and played with the Rice boys. He hasn't
been up there the last two or three years, ( T. 225,
226). Austin kept his cattle, horses and hay in the barn.
They could have used part of it for Austin and part
for Dave, but he guessed they stacked the hay separate,
(T. 226).
Erma Rice stated that she told Austin his father
had left hini the property below the road but not the
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barn; that his father intended that for the mountain
land and that Austin said he would like to buy the
'
barn, (T. 231). Austin denied the statement that he
would like to buy the barn. From her own evidence
Erma Rice admits that she advised Austin that under
the will he didn't get the barn. She said that her mother
told Austin to go on using the barn ~as he h1ad done, (T.
232). She intentionally omitted any reference to the barn
property in the petition for distribution, (T. 232). She
was the one who decided what Austin got under the
will, (T. 233).
Over objection Erma Rice was permitted to say that
at heT fatlh er's bedside the day before the will was signed
her father instructed 1\ir. Budge, his attorney, to draw
the will; that her father said that he had a piece of property below the highway, and he wanted that to go to
his son, Austin, and that was to be his full share, and,
no more, " ( T. 232, 234). In spite of this ~alleged instruction the will does not read that way, so ·counsel did not
follow the alleged directions, ( T. 234), and the will does
not read that Austin is to get a piece of p~roperty below
the highway. As a matter of fact Exhibit 1 shows that
David L. Rice had many pieces of property below the
highway. According to Erma's testimony David L. Rice
didn't say anything about Austin getting the property
"he now occupies''. The testimony was not only incompetent but directly contradicts the will. The witness conceded that the inventory and the old deed ·carry
water rights, but she didn't petition the court to distribute to Austin the land with ap·purtenant water rights,
1
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nor did she call the court's attention to the fact that the
\Yater and the corral property had been left out, ( T. 235).
She told Austin that the will provided that he should
not get water or the barn and corral prop~erty, (T. 235,
236).
\\..-hen her father died he had 25 milk cows, they
were kept in the barn and pasture on the Rawl Rice
place, except those that "'\Yere at Tremonton. They had
been there all winter. He had nothing on Austin Rice's
place "'\Yhen he died except some hay which he bought
in Kaysville. This hay was bought while her father
was sick and confined t.o the hospital. Austin would have
paid for it, but after her father became sick, Austin
\Vasn't at the house and her £:ather vv.asn't able to go
down th·ere, (T. 239, 240). Nothing was S'aid at the
hearing on the pe1tition for di!strihution about leaving
out the water rights and about 'leaving out the land
on which the barn is located, and nothing was s·aid
to the judge about it, (T. 241).

The evidence is undisputed and is corroborated by
Erma Rice that after David L. Rice built the new barn
up north, he never kept anything on the Austin Rice
place, and at the time he died nothing of David L. Rice's
was on the barn or corral property.
STATEMENT OF ERRORS
1. That finding o~ fact No. 8,_ and particularly the
first paragraph thereof is not supported by and is contrary to the evidence, and the court was in ·error in
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further finding in said finding No. 8 that David L. Rice
irrigated from 60 to 70 acres of crops north of Davis
Creek by what is known as the North Ditch, and that
David L. Rice after the year 1919 did not use any water
during his 32 hour turn through the White Ditch, and
that Austin Rice used the water from Davis Creek
through the White Ditch to water eight acres of orchard
and garden, and that said findings are contrary to and
are not supported by the evidence, and that the court was
in error in not finding in said paragraph 8 or elsewhere
that David L. Rice was also one of the land owners
in the vicinity of said Creek who used such water as.
they desired for early irrigation from Davis Creek.
2. That finding of fact No. 9, and particularly the
second sentence thereof to the effect that there never
was appurtenant to the 27 acre track decreed Austin
Rice a ten hour use of Davis Creek each year, hut that
there was a four hour right from 1 :00 A.M. until 5 :00
A.M. Thursday of each week appurtenant to said land,
is contrary to and not supported by the ·evidence, and
that the court was in error in not finding in said paragraph 9 or elsewhere in the findings that there was also
appurtenant to said 27 acre tract water as available
during the p·eriod when the same was not in turns.
3. That the court was in error in describing the
decreed tract a.s consisting of 27.71 acres.
4. That finding of fact No. 11 is in conflict with
finding of fact No. 6; that finding of fact No. 12 is in
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conflict 'vith finding of fact No. 6 and both are in conflict with, contrary to, and not supported by th·e evidence.
5. That finding of fact No. 13 is contrary to and is
not supported by the evidence, and particularly that
portion of said finding No. 13 that the barn and corral
property was not occupied by Austin Rice at the' date
of the will, and that the said prop1erty is not an essential
or necessary part of plaintiff's farm.
6. That finding of fact No. 14 Is not supported
by and is contrary to the evidence, and particularly that
portion of said finding of fact No. 14 commencing with
the third sentence thereof to the effect that Erma Rice
did not at any time misrepresent any facts or conditions
to Austin Rice or practice any fraud upon him, and particularly that portion of fin·ding of fact No. 14 that the
defendant, Erma Rice, was not guilty of any fraud whatsoever, and that Austin Rice had ample opportunity without p1revention or interference of defendant to inform
himself, and that he .neglected to interpose any objection to the granting of the petition for distrihu~tion or the
entry of the decree.

7.

That finding of fact No. 15 is contrary to and
not sup~ported by the evidence.
8. That conclusion of law No. 1 is contrary to and
not supp·orted by the evidence and is contrary to and
in conflict with finding of fact No. 6.
9. That conclusion of law No. 2 is in error in
describing the decreed tract as 27.71 acres, and that the
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conclusion that plaintiff have decreed to- him four hours
each week of the waters of Davis Creek from 1 :00 A.M.
to 5 :00 A.M. on Thursday is contrary to and not supported by the evidence.
10. That the decree and the whole thereof is contrary to and not supported by the evidence and is erroneous in both law and fact.
11. That the court erred in allowing Erma Rice
over pJaintiff's objection to testify, (T. 233), as follows:

'' Q.

Now, were you present at the time I was
taking notes at your father's bedside, the
day before the Will was signed~

A.

Y·es, sir, I was.

Q.

Did you hear your father's in·structions to me
at that time~

MR. JONES.:

I obj·ect to that, as,

Q. Answer, Yes or No.
A..

Yes, sir, I did.

Q.

Now, what did your father say~

MR. JONES:

I object to that as incompetent.

* * * *

THE CO·URT: · I think I will overrule the. objection and let the witn~es:s answer.
* * * *

Q.

State what your father said with reference
to the land that Austin was to receive.

A.

When he was dictating th·e terms. of the Will
to Mr. Budge he said,· 'That h·e had a piece
of p-rop1erty below the highway, and he wanted
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that to go to his son, Austin, and that was to
be his full share, and no more'."
12. That the court erred in finding and decreeing
that Austin Rice was not entitled to the barn and corral
property situated :across the s'treet from the decreed
property.

13. That the court erred in finding and decreeing
that there were not ten shares of water from Davis
Creek appurtenant to the deereed land.

14. That the court erred in finding and decreeing
that there were only four shares of water ap·purtena.nt
to the decreed land.
15. That the court erred in failing to find and decree that the decreed land had app·urtenant to it freshet
or early waters from Davis Creek before said water
goes on turns to the extent such high water is available.
16. The court erred in finding and holding that
Erma Rice was not guilty of disception or fraud, and
that the plaintiff was not misled by her repres·entations.
17. The court erred in finding and holding that
Erma Rice .carried out the provisions of her father's
will, and said finding and holding is contrary to and in
conflict with other findings and holdings of the court
heretofore specifically objected to.
18. That the court erred in holding and finding in
favor of the defendant, Erma Rice, and against the plaintiff, Austin Rice.
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ARGUMENT
·We shall discuss first the water right to which
Austin Rice is entitled under the will of' his father, and
second the land to which he is entitled under such will.
Before doing this, we wish briefly to dis-cuss the theo-ry
under which this case was originally brought.

THE PETITION, AMENDED PETITION AND
CO·MPLAINT OF AUSTIN RICE
0Tiginally, we petitioned the court to amend its
decree upon the theory that Erma Rice was a trustee
and that as such trustee she intentionally and for the
purpose of depriving the petitioner thereof omitted
from her petition for ·distribution his appurtenant water
rights and the barn and corral property. The theory
of this petition was that the executrix was an officer of
the court, and that if she misrep·resented to the court
to the detriment of the beneficiaries. whom she was bound
to protect, the court could correct the wrong regardless
of whether the fraud was intrinsic or ·extrinsic. The
authorities which we shall hereafter cite to the court are
unanimously to this effect, including the decisions from
this court.
The trial court sustained a demurrer to this petition, and we amended to set forth in addition to the
allegations of the original petition the allegations that
Erma Rice deliberately deceived the plaintiff and by her
deception deprived him of his day in court. The amended
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petition was based only in part upon extrinsic fraud, but
both petitions were founded upon the theory that the
executrix misrepresented to the court to the injury of
the beneficiaries whom she was obligated to protect, and
to her own advantage. All of the authorities which we
shall hereafter cite hold that such conduct of an executrix or trustee is fraud whether it is called intrinsic
or extrinsic and will be corrected by the court regardless
of the label used to describe such conduct. But we also
submit that despite one finding of the trial court to the
contrary, the record conclusively shows from Erma's
own testimony that she erroneously advised Austin of
the contents of the will and that he relie·d upon her to
his loss and her gain, and this error was perpetuated in
the p·etition for and the decree of ·distribution without
any semblance of hearing on Austin's rights. The
amended eomp1!aint merely ·called at tention to the fact
that Austin Rice didn't get 27 acres of land but got 25
acres.
1

THE WA·TER RIGHT
By its decision in this case on the former appeal
this court has already app1roved the contention made by
the plaintiff that water app:urtenant to land passes· without mention. (See also In re: Johtns:on's Estate, 64 Utah
114, 228 Pac. 748.) Thus, when the testator devised to

Austin the land he now oooupies, that devise carried with

it all water appurtenant to such land. The land decreed
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to Austin also carried with it all appurtenant water.
The statute, 100-1-11, U.C.A. 1943, provides as follows:
''A right to the use of water appurtenant to
land shall pass to the grantee of such land, and, in
cases where such right has been exercised in irrigating differ·ent pareels o.f land at different
times, such right shall pass to the grantee of any
parcel of land on which such right was exercised
next preceding the time of the execution of any
conveyance thereof; subject, however, in all cases
to payment by the grantee in any such conveyance of all amounts unpaid on any ass·essment
then due upon any such right; provided, that any
such right to the use of water, or any part thereof, may be reserved by the grantor in any such
conveyance by making such reservation in express terms in such conveyance, or it may be
separately conveyed.''
s~ection

100-1-10 as amended in 1945 reads that when
water is represented by shares of stock in a corporation,
it shall not be deemed to be app·urtenant to the land. This
amendment and p·rDVision of 100-1-11 make it quite clear
that all water appurtenant to land is transferred without mention except where the water is represented by
shares of stock in a corporation. The waters of Davis
Creek are not represented by shares of stock in a corporation. Davis Creek Water Users Company is an
unincorporated association, ( T. 10). The decree of distribution, therefore, without mentioning the water decreed Austin all water appurtenant to his decreed land,
as determined by the use at the time the will was made.
Inasmuch as a dispute arose, it was p·rop·er for the
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court to clarify its decree and specify definitely the
"Tater right appurtenant to the decreed land.
The question of 'vhat water Austin is entitled to may
be determined 'vithout any reference whatever to the
question of fraud. The decree of distribution transferred
the appurtenant water to him, and the only problem with
reference to the water is to determine what water was
appurtenant to the decreed land. That water already
has passed to Austin under the decree of distribution.
It is not necessary to consider the question of fraud
or misrepresentation on the part of the defendant with
reference to the water. Such fraud and misrepresentation nevertheless exist in legal effect, as we shall hereafter point out.
It will be noted that the statute provides that where
a water right has been exercised in irrigating different
parcels of land at different tim-es, ''such right shall
pass to the grantee of any parcel qf land on which such
right was exercised next p·receding the time of the execution of any conveyance thereof''. It becomes important, therefore, to determine what water right was used
on Austin's land next preceding the execution of the
will in 1944 and also at the time of the testator's death
in 1945.

Many of the defendant's witnesses, including the
defendant herself, testified that no water whatsoever
was used on Austin's land at any time from Davis Creek
through the White Ditch. The court did not believe any
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purtenant to the land which -could only come from Davis
Creek through th·e White Ditch. Since the trial court
refused to believe these witnesses including the defendant, we may do likewise. The remainder of the defendant's witnesses stated that the water from Davis Creek
was never used on the Austin Rice farm after the same
went on turns. The court did not believe these witnesses
but found as indicated that there was a water right
appurtenant to the decreed land from Davis Creek
through the White Ditch.
Erma Rice, the defendant, testified that she knew
that the deed by which David Rice acquired the decreed
land carried a definite recital conveying appurtenant
waters; .that the inventories in the estate matter inventoried ·and ap·praised the land with appurtenant water,
and that she purposely omitted from the petition for
distribution any reference to waters appurtenant to
the land to he decreed to Austin, and that she pm~posely
did not call the omission to the attention of the -court,
and that the court entered its decree of distribution without having called to its attention by her the foregoing
facts. It is quite ·clear from the contentions that were
made at the former hearing of this case when the trial
court sustained the demurrers, which ruling was reversed by this court, that both defendant and her counsel
assumed that because the will did nO't mention water
in connection with the land decreed to Austin no water
'
should be decreed to him. This position is erroneous,
and the water appurtenant to the land did pass to
Austin under the will. It is undisputed in the record
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that Erma Rice, the defendant, deliberately intended to
deprive Austin of any water for use on the decreed land.
Her excuse for it was that she knew there was no water
from D-avis Creek ap·purtenant to said land. 'This the·
trial court finds was not true. Erma Rice states that
she told Austin that there was no water right. Assume
that she did and Austin believed her, as she states he
did, and it later develop·ed, as it has developed, that
there "\Vas water app·urtenant to the land and that he
"\Vas entitled to it. Then it follows beyond dispute that
Erma Rice is asserting to Austin that Austin got no
'vater under the will was wrong, and if Austin believed
her, he was misled by her assertion to his injury and
to her· benefit. Erma Rice along with the other children
of David L. Rice benefit by her misrepresentation. An
executrix is also a trustee and .cannot excuse her misrepresentation of a fact upon the plea that she was
mistaken, and particularly may she not do so when. she
herself benefits by the misrepresentation at the expense
of the beneficiary. If a trustee could excuse his misrepresentations upon the ground that he thought they
'vere true, then the trustee's state of mind and not the
state of mind of the testator would determine what the
beneficiaries received under the will. It is no excuse for
the defendant to say, "I thought I was right, and, therefore, I can not be ·charged with misrepresentation, and
I may keep; what I have secured by such misrepresentation merely because I thought I was right in making the
untrue state·ment." In this case Erma Rice admitted
that she and not the court determined what Austin got
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under the will. She decided that the decreed land didn't
have any water right, and she decided that Austin should
not have the barn and corral property. She assumed
to interpret the will without calling the facts to the
court's attention. Erma Rice did not have the right to
decide what land Austin should receive, nor did Erma
Rice have the right to decide whether or not he should
have a water right. When she assumed to make this
deeision, even though she told Austin that that was all
he got, she was wrong. She misrepresented to him and to
the court, and she cannot benefit by it, nor can her action go uncorrected whether it be -called intrinsic or extrinsic fraud.
It was impossible to determine from defendant's
evidence what wa:ter was appurtenant to the decreed
land. As indicated above, according to most of her
witnesses, including the defendant, there was no water
appurtenant. But some of defendant's witnesses did
state that during high water season water had been used
on the decreed tract from Davis Creek. The trial court
in order to determine the appurtenant water went outside of the issues of the case, figured up a hypothetical
acreage watered by David L. Rice from Davis Creek
and divided that by the number of hours he had in the
creek, and by this method concluded that Austin had
four hours. It was not :an issue in this case as to how
much water David Rice used on lands other than
Austin's, nor was it an issue as to how much land David
L. Rice irrigated from Davis Creek. That issue was
created entirely by the trial court. In or·der to reach the
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total acreage of 60 to 70 ac.res north of D:avis Creek
found by the court to be the land of David Riee watered
from Davis Creek, it is necessary to include the Glover
tract, and the testimony is all to the effect that the
Glover tract when it "\Yas irrigated from Davis Creek was
only irrigated infrequently, and then only a portion of
it. There is no evidence whatever that immediately p·receding the execution of the will or immediately prior to
the death of David L. Rice any of his 32 hours of water
were used on the Glover tract, and it is also impossible
to determine from the record which of his tracts of land
he watered from Davis Creek during the last few years
of his life. There is some evidence that at one time
there was an orchard, but whether this orchard was.
watered in recent years is not clear, nor is it clear how
many acres were actually dependent upon Davis Creek.
Had it been an issue in this case to determin·e what lands
of David L. Rice were watered from Davis Creek, that
testimony would have been produced clearly. It may
even be gleaned from the record that not more than
30 or 40 acres of David L.. Rice's land were watered from
Davis Creek. The testimony of LeGrande Rice would
show anything from 30 acres up to 50 or 60, but Austin
Rice in his affidavit in support of his motion for a new
trial calls attention to the fact that the Richards' place
has two shares of water from Steed Creek, and that the
80 acres where the new barn is located has water from
Farmington Canyon; that the Glover field has ten hours
of water, his, the plaintiff's land has ten hours of water

and the Rawl Rice place has twelve hours of water from'
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Davis Creek, making the total of 32 hours; that the
ditch to the north of Davis Creek was not constructed
until 1920 or 1921, (R. 140, 141). This is not denied.
Erma Rice denies only part of this affidavit. She admits that there are two shares for the Richards' fann
from Steed Creek but says said shares have never been
used on the Richards' farm, (R. 146). However, that
was not the issue in this case. The issue in this case was
what was the water appurtenant to the Austin Rice tract
at the time David L. Rice made his will. We must look
elsewhere than to the defendant for this information,
par'ticularly since the court refus-ed to believe any of the
defendant's witnesses and did hold that there was some
water appurtenant to the Austin Rice land.
David L. Rice himself in 1936 in making his application to the State· Engineer, plaintiff's Exhibit "H",
gives us the most significant evidence in this case. On the
30th day of January, 1936, David L. Rice applied to
the State Engine·er for a well which he asserted was comm·eneed in 1928 and comp,leted in 1928, and which is
the well on the southeast corner of the land which was
never used. He stated that this well was to irrigate nine
acres of the decreed land. He then makes this significant statement: "This well is sup·plement to drain and
canyon water.'' As late as 1936 David L. Rice asserts
that he is using the canyon water on the Austin Rice
plaee for nine acres of land. He acquired this water, as
we have shown by the abstract, as early as 1902, and
he was still claiming it in 1936. He had used it all through
the years. The canyon water the evidence shows without
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dispute is from Davis Creek through the White Ditch.
Thos·e ·witnesses of defendant, including the defendant,
who testified that neither David Rice nor any one else
had any canyon \Yater for the Austin Rice tract are directly disputed by David L. Rice himself as late as 1936.
Both the plaintiff and his wife testified without equivocation that they had a ten hour water right from 7 :00 Wednesday night to 5 :00 Thursday morning; that they had
used it every week with the knowledge and consent of
David L. Rice; that they w·ere using it at the time the
will was made and at the time of his death; that it was
necessary in Drder to mature crops on their land, and
that crops could not be matured on their land without it.
The amount of land to be irrigated on the Austin
Rice tract from Davis Cre·ek was estimated by the court
to be eight acres, (R. 124). D:avid Rice in 1936 said he
was irrigating nine acres, while Austin Rice and his
wife stated that they irrigated from eight to twelve acres
of" garden and orchar·d, the hay crop durmg the entire
high water season, ·and about one-half of the hay acreage
from the water shares so long as it lasted, but that later
in the season when the water was on turns the garden
and orchard needed it all. There is nothing in the reeord to dispute the testimony of the plaintiff and his wife
except the defendant's witnesses whom the court did not
believe. Austin Rice and his wife specifically testified
that they used the water from 7 :00 Wednesday night to
5 :00 Thursday morning, and that the ten hours of water
were used on the meadow hay as abov~e stated in addition
to nine acres of garden, ( T. 74-76, 89, .90). There is a
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distinction between the meadow hay and the alfalfa hay.
The alfalfa hay does not require as much irrigation from
Davis Creek, ( T. 75).
Austin Rice and his wife are supported in their
-evidence that they used the water from the White Ditch
during the irrigation season by Clifford Hughes, the
Secretary of the Davis Creek Water Users Association,
his brother, Irvin Hughes, and James H. McQuiston.
Irvin Hughes and McQuiston definitely testified to the
use by Austin of the Davis Creek water at the time
nearest th~e making of the will and the death of the
testator and definitely established that this water was
used on his farm, was necessary to mature his crops,
that the erops could not he matured without it, and that
there was no other place to get wat~er for his farm for
irrigation than from Davis Creek. These witnesses did
not specify definitely the hours of the turn, although
McQuiston positively stated that the turn was at night
after he, M-cQuiston, got home from work a't the Cudahy
Plant which would be after 7 :00. ~e had been on the
Austin Rice farm, helped him irrigate and had gone with
him up the ditch to get the water, and on various occasions the water was already coming down the ditch at
the time he got to the Rice farm. It is not difficult tq
understand why these witnesses didn't know the exact
hours. None of the witnesses were particularly interested in Austin Rice's water turn and had no occasion
whatever to become familiar with it. They only observed it as a neighbor might observe it or as the Hughes
observed it because of Austin going across their property
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to take it and see it running do"~n the ditch and onto
his land, or nlcQuiston who helped to irrigate. The
White Ditch flows high on the side of the n1ountain. It
is not visible unless one has occasion to observe it.
Austin's ~turn \Yas in the middle of the night, and it wourd
be strange indeed if the neighbors were up high on the
hill roaming around in the middle of the night to watch
Austin use his water. However, there is no excuse for
Erma Rice or her brothers testifying that there never
was any water used from Davis Creek on the Austin
Rice tract. The very fact that they would so testify
makes it imperative to disregard their entire testimony.
It could be none other than a wilful misrepres-entation
and when Erma Rice presisted in this not only in her
petition for distribution but in her answer and at the
trial her intention to misrepresent is clearly established
by her actions, regardless of anything she may say to
the contrary. Actions speak louder than vvords.
The court believed the plaintiff's witnesses as to
the fact that there was an appurtenant water right on
the Austin Rice tract from Davis Creek, but in fixing the
amount of water at four hours we submit the eourt was
in error. There is nothing to support that finding except
a calculation by the court based upon assumed facts.
which were not in issue and were not, we believe, correctly evaluated by the trial court. We do not believe
the record establishes even from the inconclusive testimony on the point that David L. Rice- watered 60 to 70
acres on the north from Davis Creek and that Austin
only watered 8. Austin watered from 9 to 12 acres and
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part of his timothy hay crop·. He US'ed water at will
during the high water season. David L. Rice, so far
as we ean speculate, irrigated anY'vhere from 30 acres
up~ards to the north of Davis Creek. Whether or not
this irrigation was in the earlieT years or in the late
years does not appear clearly from the record. The
court did not decree Austin any of the high "vater except four hours. This is clear error. Even som'e of defendant's witness·eS testified that the high water was
used on the Austin Rice tract at will whenever available.
The trial court having found that Austin had an appurtenant water right from Davis Creek, had only the
testimony of Austin and his wife as to the extent of that
right. The- court having disbelie-ved the defendant's witnesses and having believed the plaintiff's witnesses that
there was a water right at all times, completely disregarding the testimony of Austin and his wife as to the
extent of that right. Th·ere is no dispute in the record
that if there is an ap·purtenant water right from Davis
Creek to the Austin Rice land, that water right is from
7 :00 Wednesday night to 5 :00 Thursday morning after
the water goes on turns, and an unlimited right in the
high water.
It is ~established that the Austin Rice tract is onehalf or more miles away from the Davis Creek. The
Davis Creek flows on the high ground to the east of
the highway, then crosses the road and has to go through
a dirt ditch south to Austin's. While th·ere is no testimony in the record as to the length of time that it now
takes the water to go through the White Ditch from
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Davis Creek, it is a certainty that it '\Vould take it at
least one-half an hour to one hour to go from the Creek
to the Austin Rice tract under head. This would leave
Austin under the court's decree from three to three and
one-half hours of water to water the entire upper part
of his farm. The \Yater decreed would be of little or
no us·e to him at all for that purpose. D·avid L. Rice
bought the Austin Rice land nearly twenty years before
the North Ditch was constructed. Erma Rice in her
affidavit, (R. 146), did not deny or dispute the assertion
of Austin in his affidavit, (R. 140), that the ditch to the
north of Davis Creek to supply lands of David L. Rice
\Vas not constructed until 1920 or 1921. Certainly, p·rior
to that time David Rice didn't use any waters from
Davis Creek on his lands to the north and none of the
water that was appurtenant to the Austin Rice tract,
lmown as the Stephenson tract, at the time of the purchase. Immediately prior to the making of the will and
immediately prior to the death of the testator the only
evidence in the record that water from Davis Creek was
used on the Austin Rice tract ·for a specified period is
that it was used from 7:00 Wednesday night to 5 :00
Thursday morning after the water went on turns and
at no specified limited time during high water. The court
having found that there was an app!Urtenant water right,
we submit, is bound to decree a water right that will he
appurtenant that is effective for the purpose for which
water is used and not a dribble that will do no good to
any one. We submit, having found that there is an appurtenant water right, the only evidence in the ree.ord
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as to the extent of that watier right is as above indicated
and that the court should have decreed Austin the water
from Davis Creek before the same goes on turns whenever it is availabl,e, and after the same goes on turns
from 7 :00 Wednesday night to 5 :00 Thursday morning.
'THE BARN AND CORRAL PROPERTY
It becomes important to determine svhat property
Austin occupied at the time of the execution of the will
and the death of the testator, David L. Rice. The defendant assumed to determine what that property was,
and after she had determined it, she reported to the
court that thaf was the property willed to Austin. As
we have shovvn, the property actually decreed to him
comprises 25 plus acres and included in the 25 acres is
a 3 acre tract acquired by David L. Rice in 1909 and
located on the south side about the center of the decreed
property, (P. 10 of Exhibit "B "). 'The defendant included this tract of 3 acres and excluded the 3 plus
acres upon which the plaintiff's barn and corral are
situated. She ·did the selecting, and she assumed to
determine wha;t property the testator devised to his son.
Why she included the 3 acres of p~astur.e }and and excluded the barn and corral does not appear since both
are located in Section 31. Since each tract is approximately the sam-e size as the other, she could have included either if her theory was that 27 acres was the
land devised, instead of the devise being as i't actually
was, the land now occupied by Austin in Section 31. As
a matter of fact, she had no right to make any determinaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion. That determination w·as made bv the testator, and
he left . A. ustin the land no'v occupied by him in Section
31. The 25 acres decreed pllls the 3 and a fraction acres
upon which the barn and corral are situated approximate 27 acres. Obviously, the determination in the will
of the land by acreage is expressly only an approximation, and the devise actually was the land then occup~ied
by Austin, and the 'vords, '' 27 acres, more or less'',
are merely descriptive. Since the barn and corral p~ro
perty plus the decreed land approximate 27 acres, if
they were occupied by Austin at the time of the making
of the will and the death of the testator, then that is
the land decre·ed 'tio him, and when the ·defendant deliberately omitted that land in her petition for distribution
and deliberately told Austin, as she herself said ·she did,
that he was not devised that land, her action -vvas fraudulent, if in fact Aus!tjjn did occupy the corral and barn
property. The evidence ,concerning the barn and corral
property is all one way. The court found that Austin
and his father jointly used the barn and corral property,
but specifically found that it was not occupied by
.Aiustin as a part of the approximately 27 acres at the
date of the will, and that the said property is not an essential or necessary part of plaintiff's farm, (R. 125).
These findings are directly contrary to the evidence.
There is some evidence that David L. Riee did use the
corral property to run some of his

cattl~e,

and the de-

fendant's witnesses, some of them, attempted to give
the impression that David Rice used the property jointly with Austin. However, none of defendant's witnesses
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nor did the defendant testify that at the time of the
making of the will David Rice vvas using the barn and
the corral property. Rawl S. Rice testified that he was
familiar \Vith this P'roperty prior to 1928 and that's all
he testified to. James S. Rice didn't testify to anything
with reference to this property. LeGrande Rice stated
that his father and Austin kept cattle and hay in the
barn; that his father repaired the barn twice, but he
couldn't say when it was, hut it was two years after
Austin went on there in 1937 which would be in 1939.
He didn't know whether Austin had kept up the prop·erty or not, but Austin and his wife did help to keep
up the fences and repair them. His father and Austin
fed some ca;ttle there together. He could not say whether
or not Austin was paid for doing this. He said that
Austin kept his eattle, his fa.rm n1achinery and his hay
on the prop,erty, and that he had no other place to keep
them. Rawl Rice, the grandson, didn't know anything
about the p~roperty from 1942 to 1946. He was not
present when the will was written nor when David Rice
died. He did say, however, tha:t while he was on the
property Austin kept hay and eattle there as did also
his grandfather, hut he doesn't know whether or not the
grandfather paid Austin for keeping the stock. Austin
had no other pWace to keep~ his eattle or hay. Valance
C. Glover had seen David Rice use the barn and corral
property but no specific times were mentioned except
that David Rice was around the property on and off
up until the time of his death. Of course, this was not
disputed. This witn.ess did say he couldn't tell the years,
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but he rented a piece of land right across from the barn
around 1930 to 1940. Lately he hasn't been there so
much. He hadn't been up there the last two or thre·e
years. Austin kept his cattle, horses and hay in th·e
barn. The barn could have been used part for Austin and
part for David L. Rice, but he guess-ed they stacked the
hay separate. Erma Rice, the defendant, said she told
A~ustin that his father left him the property below the
road but not the barn. Under her own evidence she advised Austin that under the will he didn't get the barn
and that she intentionally omitted any refer~nce to the
barn in the petition for distribution. Erma Rice, however, testified that at the tin1e he-r fa;ther died none
of his cattle or hay were on the barn or corrol property; that they were all elsewhere. So all of defendant's witneS'ses who testified on the subject stated that
Austin kept his cattle, hay and farm implements at all
times on the barn and corral property, and that he had
no other place to ~eep them. Defendant's own witnesses
dispute the finding of the trial court that Austin didn't
occupy the land and that it was not an essential part of
his farm. That Austin did not occupy the land jointly
with his father is undisputed. Austin stated that after
he moved onto the property, his father ran some of
his -cattle there but never without consultation with
Austin; that his father paid him for any hay used; that
when his father's cattle ran in the corral his father gave
Austin pe·rmission to. run his cattle on the mountain
land above. Austin and his wife testified that 4 or 5 years
before he di·ed David L. Rice built a new barn to the
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north and after that, he never kept any hay or cattle
on the Austin Rice property. This testimony is undisputed. No witnesses testified that at the time of the
making of the will David L. Rice was using the barn
and corral property at all. He had removed all of his
oa~tle and hajy to the new barn and at the time of the
making of the will Austin Rice had exclusive possession
of the barn and corral property, but under all the evidence it is -conclusive that Austin did occupy the barn
and corral property, and that he had no other place for
his hay, cattle or farm i1nplements. The court is clearly
in error in holding that Austin did not occupy the barn
and corral property at the time of the making of the
will.
The court permitted the defendant over plaintiff's
objection to testify what her father said to Mr. Budge
the day before the will was signed about what land
Austin was to receive, ( T. 233, 234, 235). We submit
this was clear error. Our statute, 102-2-2, is in line with
the general rule that ora.l~declaration of the testator cannot be used to determine his intentions; that his intentions are to be ascertained from the words of the will.
In order to determine what land .Austin occupied there
was no necessity to have the ·defendant testify what her
father said to Mr. Budge when he was dictating the
terms of his will. The presump,tion would be that Mr.
Budge wrote into the will what the testator dictated.
There is not one wor:d in the will that Austin is to receive a piece of testator's lan~d below the highway.
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ant said nothing to the effect that her father said Austin
was to receive the land he no\v oecupies. If her testimony is to be believed, then nir. Budge con1pletely failed
to follow the testator's directions. The will reads that
Austin is to receive the land he now occupies, ·and no
instruction of this kind appears from the supposed conversation with the testator. It cannot be assumed that
the trial court ignored this erroneous, revidence since the
trial court's findings are ,directly supported by this
erroneous and incompetent evidence, and it is impossible:
to determine how much this incompetent ~evidence influenced the trial court, and, therefore, the reception
of this evidence was prejudicial error. Ho\vever, since
it so clearly appears without dispute that Austin did
occupy the barn and corral p-roperty, we submit that
this court should direct the correction of the findings,
conclusions and decr1ee and that the abov~e stated incompetent evidence is only another ground for demonstrating the error of the trial court.
The mere fact· that at sometime some of David L.
Rice's cattle were in the corral does not establish that
Austin was not oecupying the property. The record also
shows that David L.. Rice used Austin's decreed land for
the planting of sugar beets when Austin had the property. As a matter of fact, David L. Rice owned all the
land until his death and could haVre ·done with it as
he pleased. It was not a question of whether David L.
Rice made any use of the p·rope-rty. The- question is,
what property did. Austin occupy at the time of the
making of the will and the death of the testator, and that
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he occupied the barn and corral property is established
without dispute. It is further ·established without disput that after David L. Rice built the new barn four or
five years before his death he never did use the barn and
corral property. Some of the witnesses tried to give
the impression that David L. Rice stored hay in the
barn that was hauled from Kaysville, but Austin Rice
stated that th~e hay from Kaysville was hauled into his
father's barn and into the barn "\Vhere he now is upon
instructions from his father, and his father gave him
his share of the hay on shares, but he, Austin Rice,
brought a check to his father from the Smith Canning
Company and gave it to him, and the father said: "I
want to give it back to ·you. You ought to have it all,
but I have got to have more than 1;2 of it", (T. 252, 253).
Erma Rice did not dispute this, nor did any one else.
In his decision the trial court indicates that because the
:father didn't give the barn and -corral property to the
plaintiff in his lifetim·e the plaintiff, therefore, cannot
recover, regardless of the question of whether or not
he occupied the property. The trial eourt says that the
father allowed the plaintiff to us·e the barn and corral
and exercised the control over it. The father also only
allowed the plaintiff to use the other prop·erty and the
water. All of it was the property of th·e father during
the father's lifetime. He never gave any of it to the
plaintiff. The controlling question is not whether the
~ather

gave th·e prop-erty to the p~laintiff in his lifetime
or whether the father exercised any control over the
property during his lifetime because the evidence shows
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that the father owned and exercised control over all of
the property and the water. There is no evidence in the
record that the father exercised control over the corral
any different than he did over the other propeTty. Plaintiff and his wife are not disputed by any one that the
father never used the corral after plaintiff went on the
land without consulting· with the plaintiff, and that the
father's use of the corral ceased absolutely long before his death.
It would have been just as proper for the defendant to leave out the three acres of pasture land and include the barn and corral p-roperty as it was for her
to leave out the barn ~nd corral property and include
the three acres of pasture land. All of the property was
one n1enage. There was no division. The plaintiff occupied it all, and all of it together approximates 27 acres
in Section 31. We submit that the trial court was in
error in ruling as he ·did, ·and that his m·emorandum decision indicates clearly that his basis for decision was.
entirely erroneous.

THE LAW WITH REFERENCE TO
PLAINTIFF'S RIGHTS
In her proposed findings of fact the plaintiff endeavor·e·d to have the trial court find that the def·endant
read the will to the plaintiff and that he expressed satisfaction with the provision made for him. We objected to
this p-roposed finding which was· in paragraph 14 of the
proposed findings, and the court allowed our objecSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion, and it was stricken from the actual findings and
does not appear in them, ( R. 138) . The trial court,
therefore, did not believe the ·defendant's testimony that
she rend the will to 'the P'laintiff. The p·}aintiff and his
vvife testified tha't they ·did no't read the will and only
knew what was in it from the statements of Erma Rice.
The trial court apparently believed this. As we have
already pointed out, if Austin actually occupied the barn
and corral prop,er'ty, and if there was actually
water ap·purtenant to the decreed land, (as the court
found there was), then defendant from her own testimony was guilty of misrepresentation when she told
Austin that he got no water nor the barn and corral
land,· and if he believed her and suffered a loss as a
consequence, her action may he corrected whetheT it is
called extrinsic or intrinsic fraud, and particularly sinc.e
she benefited from it.
The lengths to which the defendant and her brothers
wer'e willing to go to benefit at Austin's expense is
indicated from their testimony. Not only did they testify
that the decreed land had no water right from Davis
Creek which the court disbelieved, but they went ahead
with the fantastic story about how the Austin Rice land
was watered from the drains by plugging up the drains,
etc. The trial court went out to the p·roperty and viewed
it and saw how untrue this testimony was and how impossible it would be to irrigate Austin's land with these
drains. To do so would not only require water to run
uphill since the drains are all lower than the irrigated
lands, but would have required a constant and continuous digging up and plugging up of the drains according
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to the witnesses then1selves. The defendant proposed
in her proposed findings of fact, paragraph No. 10, to
have the eourt. find that the land was irrigated in this
peculiar n1anner. W·e objected to any such finding. The
court agreed with us and struck it out (R. 138), and
that finding does not appear in the court's findings.
Obviously, the court didn't believe ·either the defendant
or any of her witnesses on this point ·or on the point that
there was no appurtenant water from Davis Creek, nor
did he believe the defendant when she said Austin w~as
entirely satisfied after reading the will to reeeive only
the decreed land without water. Under these circurn.stances, it is impossible to sustain the court's finding
that the defendant did not intend to deceive the court
or defraud the petitioner; the finding that Austin did
not -occupy the 3.85 acres; that the defendant did not
know that Austin -claimed water from Davis Creek;
that Erm·a Rice did not at any time misrepresent any
facts or conditions whatsoever to Austin Rice. They are
in conflict with the testimony and with the court's finding No. 6 that Erma Rice told the court in her petition
for distribution that the decreed land without water
was all that Austin was left unde·r the will. The court
expressly found that there was appurtenant water.
Erma Rice told the court ther~e was no appurtenant
water and persist·ed in this evidence throughout the
trial. Erma Rice intended to deprive Austin Rice of
any water. The court gave him four hours. That was
fraud and misrepresentation on the part of Erma Rice
and affirmatively appears not only from the evidence
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but from the court's finding N-o. 6. The evidence establishes without dispute that Austin occupied th·e barn
and corral property and that he had no other place· to
ke:ep his cattle, hay and farm implements. That property
and the property across the street was all one menage
and used and occupied by Austin at !all times and used
exclusively by hiffi for severaJ years before his father's
death. Erma Rice told the court and intended to tell
the court that Austin Rice did not occupy this property.
That was not true, and if she told Austin that under
the will he got no wa.ter nor the barn aJld -corral property, that was untrue, and if he relied upon her, her
legal fraud and mis.repres·entation just as effectively
deprived him of his property ·as if she had done so with
the intention to defraud.
We brought this action as we have already pointed
out, upon the theory that the action of a trust:ee, and
an executrix is a trustee, who misrepresents a fact
wherehy the court is ·deceived and the beneficiary suffers,
and particularly where the trustee benefits can always
be set aside whether the conduct be denominated mistake, negligence, p·erjury, actual or constructive fraud.
Her good faith is not an element to he considered. A
fiduciary cannot make repreHentations which are in fact
untrue or only partially true and defend upon the plea
that he did not know that they were untrue or only
partially true, or that he believed them to be true or
interpose any other defense if the statements are in fact
untrue in whole or in part. Erma Rice is estopped from
raising any of these defenses. However, the lo\ver court
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sustained a demurrer to this petition, and 've amended
to plead extrinsic fraud specifically. vV·e amended but
never abandoned our theory ··w·hich we submit was estab~
lished by the evidence beyond dispute. The overwhelming majority of courts including this court sustain the
foregoing principles.
We also submit that because of the conduct of the
defendant the issu·es between plaintiff and defendant
were never presented to any court until they were h·eard
in the p·resent hearing; that beeaus.e of the conduct of
the ·defendant ther·e has never be·en any adversary proceedings between the defendant and the plaintiff and
plaintiff's rights were never presented to any- court until
this hearing. Under the decision of this court in this
case that entitles the plaintiff to maintain his action.
Defendant's belief, knowledge or intention, whether good
or bad, .are not the basis of plaintiff's rights. In assuming to decide what the plaintiff got under the \vill
defendant attempted to usurp th·e court's functions
and determine petitioner's rights for herself. Plaintiff
is not bound by any such -conduct no matter how innocent
it is claimed to he. As a matter of fact, the court's do
not attempt to determine whether the fraud is ·extrinsic or intrinsic under circumstances such ·a:s we have here
'
and some :of ~them even g-o so far -a:s to say that if i't is. necessary to denominate the action as fraudulent, it will be
called extrinsic if a fi·duciary is involved, and all of them
say tha.t the label attached to the fiducrary's conduct is
no't im.p·ortant, whether i~t he called mistake, negligence,
fraud, error, or what not. In the decision in the pr·esent
'
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case the Supreme Court quotes with ~approval the leading ·case on the ~subj~ect 'Of extrinsic fraud, U. S. vs.
Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61, 65, 25 L. Ed. 93, wherein
the Supreme Court o.f the United States discusses extrinsic fraud as involving various situations where
''there has never been a real contest in the trial or
a hearing of the case,'' as ''reasons for which a new
suit may be sustained to set aside and ignore the forIner judginent or decree, and open the ease for a new
and fair hearing''.
The authorities which we shall

h~ereinafter

cite all

hold tha;t under the doctrine of the Throclanorton case
if it is a beneficiary who has been injured hy the act of
his trustee in failing fully and frankly to disclose to the
court or the beneficiary all material facts, a judgment
obtained under such a situation will be s·et aside whether
the ground is mist:ake, negligence, perjury or because
of fraud whether the fraud be ealled intrinsic or extrinsic.
''The general rule is that the failure to perform the ·duty to make disclosures which res:ts
upon one because of a trust or confidential relation constitutes fraud sufficient for a court of
equity to relieve against the judgment. This
conclusion -could be based upon one of two
theories, namely, that the fraud involved is of
an extrinsic nature, or that the fact that the
guilty p:arty is .a fiduciary makes an ,exception to
the rule requiring the fraud to he extrinsic. Mos:t
courts simply ·declare th·e rule without discussing
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the kind of fraud involved.'' 31 Am. J ur. Sec.
67 -!, page 241.
There seen1s to be no dissent to the foregoing rule.
The authorities are uniforn1 that an executrix or adminis'tra tor is a trus\tee, and the heirs 'are the beneficiaries
of the estate. 21 An1. J ur. pp. 370, 371, sec. 4, p·p. 374,
375, sec. 8, 9. The defendant is still the executrix, the.
·estate never having been closed or terminated as provided by 102-12-19 U.C.A. 1943, or otherwise, and in her
capacity as an express trustee by the will, sh·e is under
the same jurisdiction of the same court. 102-12-31 U.C.A.
1943. Erma Rice is trustee both by the express terms
of the will and by virtue of her office as ·executrix. ~fany
of the following cases involve administrators. or executors and hold them without he·sitation to be truste·es.
A trustee will not be permitted to e~cus-e an actual violation of his trust whether intentionally or unintentionally
particularly where he benefits at the expense of the beneficiary.
Our court early recognized the foregoing rule in the
case of Benson v.s. Anderson) 10 Utah 135. That case is
in many respects analogous to the case at bar. The defendant was administr•ator of the estate of the plaintiff's
deceased husband. He had a Decree of Distribution
entered distributing all of the p~:vop~erty to himself. He
was a brother of the deceased. The p·1aintiff had notice
of all court proceedings, no appeal was. t~aken from the
Decree of Distribution and 'the time for appeal had expired when the action was brought. The p~laintiff de~Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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pended wholly upon others for information as to her
rights. Our Supreme Court held that the DHcree of
Distribution -could be reviewe·d and set aside if the same
had been obtained by either fraud or mistake that had
worked a positive injury. Citing Porn. Eq. Jur., S·ec. 919,
the Supreme Court said that if the· probate court was
laboring under a mistake as to the fa:cts or the law or
was fradulerrtly imposed upon the Decree must be set
aside. The court S'ays ''we have no doubt, however, that
the p·rbbate court was laboring under some such mistake; and whatever the mistake was it was of a vital
character as it effectually de:prived plaintiff of the home
where she lived.'' The Court. s.et aside the Decree of
Distribution and refused to allow the administrator to
profit by his breach of trust. The Utah case is cited
with approval by the S·upreme Court of California in
the case of Bohler vs. Bohler, 67 Pac. 282. The Sohler
case is one of the le,ading eases supporting the citation
from Am. Jur. supra. In that case the Sup~r,eme Court of
California held that although judgments obtained by
false and perjured ·evidence will not usually be set aside
since that constitutes intrinsic fraud, if the intrinsic
fraud is committed by an executrix the Tule does not
apply. The C·alifornia court exp;ressly held th:at the executrix was a trustee for all of the heirs as well as the
mother of the minor plaintiffs. As such it was her solemn
duty tb- s-ee that each h·eir secured exactly what he was
entitled to and if by her false and perjured evidence the
heirs were defrauded, such fraud was sufficient to set
aside the Decree of Distribution. As a matter of fact
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the court said that her concealment fron1 the minor children 'vas fraud extrinsic to the case, it prevented their
being properly represented or from being represented
at all. In the case at bar, the defendant's failure to disclose to the plaintiff that she intentionally omitted his
''tater and his barn and corral property from her p·etition was itself fraud ,extrinsic to the case. In California
the probate ·court has exclusive jurisdiction over the distribution of estate property so the equity court could
only adjudge that the person improp erly decreed the lanq
should be held as a trustee for the plaintiffs and be required to account to the plaintiffs for the value thereof
in the event the specific property could not be ret.urne·d.
There is no such limitation upon the power of this
co11:rt in this state. That question was settled by the
appeal in this. very matter. In the case of Lawn vs. Kipvp,
145 N.W. 183, the vVisconsin S·upren1e Court expressly
held that one who sustains the relation of a. trustee to
another and fails to disclose all matter pertaining to the
trust to the injury of the other is guilty of fraud; that
the duty exists independently of any judicial proceedings
and if the failure to disclose continues into the judicial
proceedings that is :extrinsic fraud under the rule of the
Throckmorton case, supra. The court quoted the familiar
maxim '' Th·ere is no wrong, a hove- infr~ctions of mere
moral obligations, without a judicial remedy.'' The
1

court further s~aid that although Bound judicial policy
require~s that litigation shall come to a final determina-

tion, the end sought is justice. ''The real p·rinciple o.f
the adjudications is that the power of equity to relieve
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against unconS'ciona.ble judgments will not be strictly
confined to such as are char~acterized by fr'aud extrinsic. * * * * * * But where there is a solemn duty to
s.peak, indep~enden tly of coercion, ·and in a judicial controversy as well, w~hether asked to S'P'eJak or not, and
there is a failure to speak, resulting in the enrichment
of the wrongdoer and the imp:overishment of the one to
whom that duty is owing, there is a fraud ·of most serious nature, and, in ~a sense, both intrinsic and extrinsic.'' ( ~talies throughout the brief are added.) Because
of the particul~ar relations of respondent to appellant
the trustee would not be allowed to pr:ofit by his fraud
whether the same be called extrinsic ·or intrinsic.
In Lar~abee vs. T.racy, 126 Pac. 2d. 947, the California Court expressly held that an ex!ecutor or administrator ·occupies a position of highest trust and confidence
not only to creditors and beneficiaries of an estate but
to the court ~as well and is required to act in entire good
faith. In that oas1e the ·executor argued, as. does the defendant here, that the heir had no right to rely upon
him and could have ~ascertained the true facts by an investigation of his own and that any fraud p~erpetrated
was intrinsic. The court s~aid:
''But quite apart from the extrinsic fraud,
the trial court was justified in vacating the order
and decree on the ground that the executor had
not made to the court a full and f.air ·disclosure
of rights of resp·ondent. * * * Whether a failure
of this obligation of the executor to the -court as
an officer of it may be classed as extrinsic or
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trinsic fraud it is nevertheless well established
'
.
that it is a fraud upon the court- and requ1r~es no
specific label (Cites note, 5 A.L.R. 672 which note
is also cited in the quotation from Am. J ur.,
supra). Here the executor in his cap~acity of
residuary legatee was unjustly enriched by the
construction placed by the court upon the will
upon his ex parte showing, to the impoverishment
of the legatee entitled to her legacy. It was. a
fraud of the most serious natur•e. It involved not
only .a breach of fiduciary duty t·o the respondent
but a breach of duty to the court.'' Page 953.
This case was appealed t·o the Supr,eme Court of
California which in its very recent affirming decision,
134 Pac. 2d. 265, answered many if not all of the questions in the case at bar. The Supreme Court of California
said in answer to the executor's contention that he erroneously believed the things he asserted t,o he true, that
this did not excuse· his conduct. The court held that
the fact th-at he had m·ade :representations which were
untrue even thou.gh he erroneously believed them to be
true, constituted extrinsic fraud. The California Court
also said, as did the Utah Court in B~enson vs. Anderson
case, supra, that either fl'1aud or mistake was sufficient
ground for equitable relief from a judgment secured by
such fraud or mistake. The California Court further
said that the executor had a ·clear ·duty to refrain from
taking an unfair advantage of the impression he had
created. "An executor has numerous fiduciary obligations to the beneficiaries of the estate. * * * 'The relation between an executor or administrator and the legatees and distribute-es like that between the trustee and
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beneficiaries of the trust, is a fiduciary relation' ". The·
court also approved the holding that extrinsic fraud or
mistake exists where the p·robate ple,adings had understated the amount of a legacy and the legatee, relying
upon the executor's statements, fails to appear at the
distribution. (page 269) That statement states exactly
the case at bar. The Court called attention to the fact,
which is likewise p·rese:nted in the ease at bar, that in
addition to occupying a relation of trust towards the
legatee, the executor also was himself a beneficiary under
the -vvill ; that there was extrinsic fraud if the p1revailing
party benefited by 'a breach of fiduciary duty and that
recovery would be allowed whether the fraud be regarded as extrinsic, an exception to the extrinsic fraud
rule or because of mistake. Another California case is
Puringt1on vs. D'yson, 65 Pac. 2nd. 777, also decided unanimously by the Supreme Court of California. In that
case the court pointed out that because ·an executor was
involved, the mere fact that the executor kept the heir
in ignorance of the trust situation (as did the executor
here) the fraud was such as to entitle the heir to equitable relief. The court said it made no difference what
the motive of the e~ecutor was, if in fact his actions de-prive an heir of her rightful share in the estate. The
defense was made in that ease, as was attemp~ted in the·
cas-e at bar, that the fraud was not e~trinsic. The Supreme Court of Calirornia considered that as not controlling. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Kauff-

man vs. McLaughlirn, 114 Pac. 2nd. 929, wherein
the court says ''When ~a relation of trust or confidence
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exists, making it the duty of defrauder in th·e trust eapacity to disclose the true state of facts, the defrauded
party is not charged with -eonstructive ·discovery of the
fraud on account of the facts being a matter of publie
record." The court quotes with ap~proval Laurn vs. Kiipvp,
supra.
:\Ir. Justice Rutledge, just prior, to his elevation to
the s.upreme Court of the United States, speaking for
the United States Court of Ap·peals for the District of
Columbia in Earll vs. Picken, 113 Fed. 2nd. 150, approved principles of law decisive in this cas·e. There a
trustee under a deed of trust was the defendant. One of
his defenses was that he acted in good f.aith and in an
honest belief that he was right. He was not permitted,
however, to use this ~argument to profit at the expense
of the cestui que trust. He was not

~permitted

to do as

defendant contends, she should he permitted to ·do in
the ease at bar. She s~ays : ''I thought I was right and
that ends the matter even though in fact I was. wrong.
I didn't do it wrongfully so I mus.t keep~ what I got."
It ""ould be a s:a;d state of affairs if a person eould thus
hoist him8elf by his own hoot strap~s ~and say because
he didn't know he was wrong he is. blameless and his
ignorance or negligence or call it what you may entitles him to keep what he in his ignorance· or negligence
'\Vrongfully acquired. A trustee is not p·ernritted to profit by his -own ignorance, oorlessness. or lack of information. The revers:e is true. It is his ·duty to lmow that
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all he speaks is the truth. As 1fr. Justice Rutledge says
( p'age 156) :

"He ·cannot commingle his trusteeship with
merchandizing on his own account. No device of
concealment, whether in the use of straw men or
otherwise, can ligitimate such miscegenation.''
He further says, ''Earll honestly may have
thought that he was acting within the law. But he
intended to make a p~rofit at the ·expense of his
beneficiaries. * * * He eannot retain it, the fruit
of his effort to make a p1rofit which he was disqualified to accept.''
Earll's honesty was immaterial if in fact he
was wrong.
Justice R.utledg.e further states ''No halfhearted diselosure -or partial discovery is sufficient in either resp·ect. The trustee's duty o.f
disclosure is not discharged by le!aving the cestui
to draw ·doubtful inferences, conclusions and suspicions from his effort to extract for his own
benefit not only the trust res but other pToperty
of the beneficiary as well.''
In that case the beneficiary had actually been the defendant in the court proceedings but had defaulted because he did not think that he! had a ehance to prevail.
The eourt, however, held that this did not bar him from
later setting aside· the judgment obtained by the trustee
to his -own advantage. The argument was made that the
fraud was intrinsic under the Thr·ockmort:on case but
Mr. Justice Rutledge disposes of that -contention ~on page
158 by stating that wheithe.r the fraud was intrinsic or
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extrinsic the result was secured by a trustee's failure to
perfor1n his duty. He says it \\'"ould be a strange law
which would allow the trustee to take advantage of the
ignorance of :the cestui to secure an invulnerable judg·ment. He says:
"The crux of the matter is that defendant's
violation of the ·dutv of dis-closure continued until
after the judgment was obtained and satisfied.
(rrhat is the situation in the ease at har.) Its effects were not overcome, as has been said, by
· plaintiff's mere suspicions. (In the case at bar
the plaintiff was not even suspicious until defend.ant thought it was too late for plaintiff to do
anything about it.) In such cirmtmst:ances it is
immaterial whethe.r· the fraud be reg·arded as
extr·ilnsic or ·as am exoe:ptmon to the imvnirnsic frwu.d
rrule," quoting 3 Freeman, Judgments 5th Edition 1925, Sec. 1235 and the note in 5 Am. L. R.
672, Am. Jur. sup.ra as follows:
''The failure to perform the duty to speak
or make disclosures which rests. upon one because
of a trust or -confidential relation is obviously a
fraud for which equity may afford relief from a
judgment thereby obtained, .even though the
bre1ach of duty OC(JIJ)rs during .a ju,dicial ·p:roce,eding and involves false testi.mony and this is true
whether such fraud be regarided as extrinsic or as
an exception to the extrinsic fraud Tule.'' In· concluding his decision Justice Rutledge
says, ''In disposing of the case as we have done,
we recognize that the defendant may have been
free, subjectively, from deliberate intention to
perp,etrate 'a fraud and that he may have regarde·d
each step :in his conduct as entirely within the
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law. * * * That he may have intended no fraud
does not overcome the fact that one has heen
committed. ''
The Circuit Court of A·pveals, 7th Circuit, in Ferguson vs. W~achs, 96· Fed. 2nd. 910, app·roved by Justice
Rutledge in the case jus.t quoted likewise quotes with approval the statement from Freeman on :fudgments. That
court also adds :
"and the foregoing propos.ition applies with
sp·eeial force when the p·arties remaining silent
owe a special duty to disclose the facts to the
very eourt in which the cause is being heard; and
it comes within th·e general test indicated by the
following language in United States vs. Throckmorton: '=K• * * these, and similar cases which show
that there has never been a real contest in the
trial or hearing of the case, are reasons. for which
a new suit may be sus·tained to set aside and
annul the former judgment or deeree, and open
the case for a new and fair hearing.' ''
The Circuit Court of Appeals. of the 8th Circuit in
Fiske vs. Budjer, 125 Fed. 2nd. 841, said that mistake
of law was no defense to a rep,reS:entation or a position
which was in fact wrong. ''If the fraud really p~revents
the complaining party from making a ·full and fair defense it will justify setting :aside a decree, whether extrinsic or intrinsic'', where there is a confidential or
fiduciary relationship.
The Supreme Court of California in another case
Olivera v.s. G~aoe, 122 P~ac. 2nd. 564, again recognizes
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that mistake a.s well as fraud ''is a recognized ground f,or
the intervention of equity where the mistake has prevented a fair adversary hearing.''

It is uniformly established that mistake, fraud and
even perjured evidence will be sufficient to set aside a
judgment p~rocured by such mistake, fraud or :perjured
evidence, where· a fiduciary relationship exists and it is
immaterial whether extrinsic or intrinsic.
Aside from fiduciary considerations, if rals.e representations ~are in fact the moving c:ause of ~action hy
another, neither ignorance, mistake nor good faith excuses the wrong.
The Supreme Court of the United St1ates. in Equitable Life Insuranoe Q,o. vs. H.alsey, Svua,;rt ·and Comp~avny,
312 U. S. 410, 85 L. Ed. 920, ap·proved as the law of Iowa
the do-ctrine that if a person relies upon representations
to his injury ·an~d they are untrue it is immaterial that.
such person did not make his own investigation to as-certain "\Vhether they were untrue or not and it is also immaterial and no defense th~t the person making the
representations relied upon information which he he~
lieved to be true but· had t'aken no effort to verify. The
cases are uniform that even in the abs·ence of ~a fiduciary
relationship, it is constructive fraud to make an assertion
of a f,aet to be true when it _is not tru,e, re:gard1ess of
whether or not the person making the assertion believed
it to be true.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Cio,0 p,er
vs. Schlesinger, 28 L. Ed. 382 (U. S. 111) approved nearly
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60 years ago the doctrine that ''It is not necessary, to
constitute a fraud, that a man who makes a false statement should know preeisely th·at it is false. It is enough
if it be false and if he made it recklessly and \vithout an
honest belief in its truth or without reasonable ground
for believing it to be true, and be made deliberately and
in such a way as to give the person to whom it is
1nade reasonable ground for supposing that it was meant
to be acted upon, and has been acted upon by him accordingly. * * * * The jury were p~roprerly instructed,
that a statement recklessly made, withou:t knowledge of
its truth, was ·a false statement knowingly made, within
the settled rule.''
If one makes representations ·as did the defendant
in her Petition for Distribution and as she also made to
Austin Rice, and he relies upon those statements and
:it turns out that her representations are false it is no
defense that she believed them to be true nor can she
assertthat he had no right to rely on them. Morrow vs.
Bonebr,ake, 115 Pa:c. 2nd. 585 (Kans~as).

Kathan vs. Comstock, 122 N.W. 1044 (Wisconsin),
TiJlestern M(JJYI!Ikf.act·urimg Co. vs. ·C1otton and Long, 104
S.W. 758 (Kentucky), Ma)r;y Pickford Oo. vs. Bayley
Brothers, 86 Pac. 2nd. 102 (Supreme Court of California). In the last ease the Sup·reme Court of California
w:as dealing with only an imp1ie·d rep·resentation and
said ''If this implied representation is f,als·e, then it is a
negligent misrepresentation which is an actionable
fraud.'' In the Wisconsin ease the Supreme Court of
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Wisconsin states that whether ther;e was moral turpitude
or not was immate-rial; that if one in dealing with
another makes misrep~resentations of a fact ma:terial to
the transaction the transaction may be voided on the
ground of fraud ,even though it is a "mer;e mistake of
f.act,-and may have the aid of equity jurisdiction to
that end. It is not a sufficient answer to the claim of
such other for such ·person to say he m~a:de the representations honestly, for it is, in law and e:quity, as r'egards avoiding such a transaction, his duty to know
whereof he speaks, or not to speak at all,as of his knowledge.'' The eourt also holds that the rule that the person deceived may act

up~on

the faith of the r'epresent,a-

tions of the other without blame to himself ''is so elementary that we will treat it as a matter not requiring
extended discussion in this opinion.''
Upon the

p~oint

that Austin could have found out

the truth himself and had

no~

right to rely on defendant,

the Kentucky eourt quotes Mr. Pomeroy to the effect
that ''The mere existence of opportunities for examination, or of sources of information, is not sufficient, even
though by means of these opportunities and sources, in
the absence of any representation at all, a constructive
notice to the party would be inferred. The doctrine of
constructive notice

~does

not ap;ply where there has been

such a rep~resentation o.f fact." This rule would apply
here in any event beeause of defendant's fidu,eiary relar
tionship. The Kentucky court further says that the party
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practicing the deception ,cannot say t1o the party deceived ''You ought not to havH believed or trusted me''
or that ''You yourself were guilty of negligence.''
It is quite signifieant in this case that the defendant
in the face of all the evidence now known to her is still
insisting on keeping Austin's property and that she has
even gone to the lengths of saying that even if she w~as
wrong she still is. entitled to keep it and that there is no
court that can take away from her this ill-gotten property. She still refus:es to make any effort to fulfill her
fiduciary obligations but is insisting with every me~ans
at her command that she keept Austin from getting what
his father willed him. She and her witnesses made no
~atte1npt

to aid the court. Their whole effort even now
is to withhold from the plaintiff his inheritance.
It is. respectfully submitted that defendant and the
other heirs of David L. Rice should not be allowed to
keep Austin Rice's property and that he should be decreed as appurtenant to his land the Tight to the flow of
Davis Creek to be limited only while the water is on turns
to 10 hours a week, from 7 o'clock Wednesday night to
5 o'clock Thurs·day morning and that he he decreed the
land as described in his amended petition-the land on
which is located his barn and corral. To do less would
he to permit the defendant to p~rofit not only by her own
wrong but by her breach of trus:t as an officer of the
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court. The plaintiff is entitled to prevail, and the case
should be reversed and the trial court ordered to amend
its findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree accordingly.
Respectfully submitted,

SHIRLEY P. JONES,
Attorney for Plailntiff
'(}ffljd A ppe lZwnt.
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